

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

547 THRU 551

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

August 8, 1975

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

#m0216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-00 BY SP2 ALM/STF

Reference is made to July 28, 1975, superseding request for FBI materials received on that date from the SSC.

Enclosed is a memorandum for forwarding to the Committee which responds to the request identified as Roman numeral II. H., Roman numeral IV. A. and B., Roman numeral V. A. through F., and Roman numeral VI. A. through H. As indicated in the memorandum, Roman numeral V. G. is being delivered by separate communication on August 8, 1975.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ST-117

REC-30

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-551

AUG 21 1975

S.F. PK 111P3
Rec'd 4-63
EHL:1hb/1hb

- Assoc. Dir. (10)
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Inspection
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

NOTE:

edm

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

All material described under the categories enumerated in the enclosed LHM, whether for delivery to the Committee or access for screening at FBIHQ, has been recorded in detail. A comprehensive memorandum is being prepared for record purposes.

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

- 1 - Mr. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

62-116395

August 8, 1975

10/3/00 #mpe/6
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/116
DECLASSIFY ON: 1

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to superseding request for FBI materials of July 28, 1975. By memorandum dated August 8, 1975, we responded to request contained in Roman numerals I through IV with the exceptions of Roman numeral II. H. and Roman numeral IV. A. and B., which requests had been deferred by agreement with SSC Staff for delivery/access August 8, 1975.

This memorandum responds to the above exceptions, as well as those requests contained in Roman numerals V and VI of the July 28, 1975, list. In the interest of completeness, all items are being listed although in some cases response has already been made. Where such response has been made, the date of our memorandum is noted for convenient reference. It is realized that this notation merely indicates the date it was forwarded by the FBI and does not signify actual delivery to the Committee since some responses have been held up by the Department of Justice or the White House for various reasons. These circumstances are believed known to the Committee; however, should there be any question as to the status, individual inquiry should be made.

II. H. This request deals with COMTELPRO materials requested initially in a letter of June 30, 1975. Requested information will be delivered to the Committee on August 8, 1975. With respect to Item 5. in the June 30, 1975, letter, such information was not compiled as part of COMTELPRO files and to list pertinent information relating to all criminal investigations directly or indirectly relating to this

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

EWL:1hb/1hb
(9) This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

551

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

COINTELPRO operation would entail a file by file review of substantive files in the involved field offices. In light of the magnitude of such an undertaking, no such review has been made. You will find, however, some information is contained in the material being delivered.

IV. A. and B. Material requested concerning abstracts of Executive Conference memorandum, as well as the so-called "Papich Committee Report," is available at FBI Headquarters.

V. A. Memorandum July 18, 1975.

B. See letter July 29, 1975, from the Attorney General to the SSC.

C. Memorandum June 30, 1975. *Dr 37*

D. Memorandum July 21, 1975. *Dr 37*

E. Memorandum June 30, 1975. *Dr 37*

F. Memorandum July 16, 1975.

G. Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, et al., will be delivered by separate communication on August 8, 1975.

VI. A. and B. Material requested will not be made available pending special procedures to be agreed upon by the Department of Justice and the SSC.

C. As noted during conference with SSC Staff Members on August 4, 1975, our records system does not allow for the retrieval of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillances which have been denied by the Attorney General. Such denials would not be included in our index of electronic surveillances. The communications would be placed in individual files and there would be no way in which they could be now identified.

D. See Attorney General letter July 29, 1975.

E. [Information concerning "SCOPE" was made available in memorandum dated July 28, 1975. Information concerning "ORKID" was treated in letter to the Committee from the Director, FBI, on July 18, 1975.] (S)

SECRET

SECRET

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

F. Material pertaining to "notional" organizations is available for review at FBI Headquarters. As indicated in discussions with Committee Staff Representatives on August 4, 1975, there is no general body of material or file which relates to identities, policies or procedures relating to notional organizations or fictitious and cover organizations as such. The use of this technique is extremely restricted and is considered, when proposed, on a case by case basis. The material, which we have isolated and are holding for review, was obtained from such individual files.

In addition to the above-mentioned material, we have one notional organization which we consider to be a peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign counterintelligence operation. In this instance, we propose to offer to Committee Staff Representatives a briefing.

G. Materials requested are available for review at FBI Headquarters.

H. Memorandum June 11, 1975.

1 - The Attorney General

SECRET

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/8/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt.
Caption of Document: Operations with respect to Intelli-
gence Activities. (7/28/75 and 8/8/75 request),
II-H; IV-A&B; V-A-F; VI-A-H

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Date: 8/8/75 ⁴¹⁵

Received by: CBenz

Title: Office Memo

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/00 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

8/8/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC

Memorandum and

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosures

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-13-00 BY SP-2 ALM/176

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 7/28/75, Part II, H; IV, A&B

6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)

S

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Counterintelligence
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Delivered to SSC material relating to COINTELPRO against
the Black Panther Party in late 1960s and early 1970s in
West Coast Offices.

Available for review at FBIHQ abstracts of Executive Conference
memorandum, as well as the so-called "Papich Committee Report";
material pertaining to "notional" organizations; FBI activities
with respect to the Ku Klux Klan.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5. woc / 8

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

N

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 8/13/75

FROM : Legal Counsel *JFA*

SUBJECT: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Assoc. Dir. ☒
Dep. AD, Adm. ☒
Dep. AD, Inv. ☒
Asst. Dir. ☐
Admin. ☐
Comp. Syst. ☐
Ext. Affairs ☐
Files & Com. ☐
Gen. Inv. ☐
Ident. ☐
Inspection ☐
Intell. ☒
Laboratory ☐
Legal Coun. ☒
Plan. & Eval. ☐
Spec. Inv. ☐
Training ☐
Telephone Rm. ☐
Director Sec'y ☐

The purpose of the memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities (Church's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 6/27/75	Request for information concerning alleged abuses.	Response delivered.
Letter, 6/30/75, received by Bureau, 7/8/75	Request pertaining to COINTELPRO.	Response delivered.
Letter, 7/3/75	Request documents pertaining to COINTELPRO be furnished to the Committee in Committee space.	Response delivered.
Letter, 7/8/75	Communication to all employees concerning Senate Select Committee inquiries.	Response delivered.
Letter, 7/14/75	Request concerning two highly sensitive Bureau programs in the foreign intelligence field.	Response delivered.
Letter, 7/14/75	Request concerning COINTELPRO documents.	Response delivered.

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Cregar)
1 - Mrs. Metcalf

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

9 AUG 21 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LAD:lad
(8)

84 AUG 28 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
 RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
 COMMITTEE REQUESTS

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/14/75	Material pertaining to Martin Luther King.	Awaiting Departmental decision.
Letter, 7/14/75	Material pertaining to Ku Klux Klan.	Response delivered.
Letter, 7/24/75	List of Agents in New York City area who had surname "Kehoe."	Response delivered.
Letter, 7/28/75	Superseding request for FBI materials for delivery and/or access of Committee.	Response delivered.
Letter, 8/5/75	Request for FBI materials with respect to surreptitious entries.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 8/7/75	Request for briefing regarding mail openings.	Response being prepared.
Letter, 8/8/75	Request for materials relating to mail surveillance.	Response being prepared.

Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/18/75	Material concerning Flagging procedures in Identification and NCIC Systems.	Response delivered to Department.
Letter, 7/25/75	Request concerns limited message-switching implementation plan.	Response being prepared.

CONTINUED - OVER



Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and
Labor Management
House Post Office and Civil Service Committee (Wilson's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 8/6/75	Request pertaining to mail openings.	Response prepared and approved by Department. Not yet delivered.

House Select Committee (Pike's Committee)

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
Letter, 7/22/75	All documents and materials provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations and request for all materials related to budgetary authority.	Awaiting Departmental decision regarding material furnished Senate Select Committee.
Letter, 7/28/75	Inquiry to encompass all aspects of the FBI budget as it relates to gathering, use and dissemination of intelligence.	Partial response prepared.
Letter, 7/30/75	Various materials related to the Spring Planning Call and for briefings with different Bureau officials.	Response prepared and delivered.

Hearings

<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Nature of Request</u>	<u>Status</u>
	Request to arrange testimony before Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning mail covers and mail openings.	Date of testimony has not been established.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

WMB
JBA
Pm
K
J
P/D



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

August 15, 1975

JBI

TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: SSC Request that FBI Provide Third-Agency Clearance
of FBI Materials Possessed by IRS

#MDR 16
10-11-00
SP-2 ALM/376

Attached is a letter dated August 12, from the Senate Select Committee asking the Bureau to provide third-agency clearance of certain FBI materials disseminated to the Internal Revenue Service which have been requested by the Senate Select Committee.

Please arrange for complying with this request if that is possible without a more detailed specification of which FBI materials have been requested of the IRS by the SSC. If additional specification is necessary, please let me know as soon as possible.

Da

REC-100

62-116375-549X

treat as original

FEB 6 1976

ENCLOSURE

5- [Signature]

LEGAL COUNSEL

1st to AG 1-DAC
LES:1116 9/4/75



FRANK C. SPENCER, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN.
 JAMES O. EASTMAN, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
 PAUL A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
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 GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
 FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARTZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
 CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

AUG 14 10 15 AM '75
 DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

August 12, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
 Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
 Office of the Deputy Attorney General
 U. S. Department of Justice
 Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

It has been called to my attention that certain FBI materials, which have been disseminated to the Internal Revenue Service, are required by the Committee in the course of our investigation of IRS. These materials appear to require third-agency clearance. Therefore, I hereby request that you obtain the necessary clearance from the FBI so that the Committee staff may have access to such materials on the same conditions that the staff has previously been given access to Internal Revenue Service materials.

Please advise Commissioner Alexander by letter as soon as this clearance is obtained. Please let me know at the same time. I hope this can be done promptly.

Sincerely yours,

John T. Elliff
 John T. Elliff

Director

Domestic Intelligence Task Force

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
 DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
 FED. BU. OF INV.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


8 AUG 13 1975

R.A.O.

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
 DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
 FED. BU. OF INV.

62-116395-549

ENCLOSURE



#moe/s
 10-11-00 SP-2 AM/276

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

September 4, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

549X

#moe/b

SP-2 ALM/jk

10-11-00

Reference is made to the memorandum dated August 15, 1975, from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, which enclosed a copy of a letter dated August 12, 1975, from the SSC asking the FBI to provide third-agency clearance of certain FBI materials disseminated to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which have been requested by the SSC.

In an attempt to identify the FBI materials referred to in the SSC letter of August 12, 1975, contact was made with Mr. Thomas V. Glynn, Assistant to the Commissioner, IRS. On September 2, 1975, Mr. Glynn advised that he had been unable to identify the FBI materials in question. He stated that he would communicate directly with Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC for a listing of the FBI materials after which he would seek FBI clearance for SSC access to these materials.

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

Assoc. Dir. — LFS:1hb/hb

Dep. AD Adm. — (9)
Dep. AD Inv. —

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. —

Comp. Syst. —

Ext. Affairs —

Files & Com. —

Gen. Inv. —

Ident. —

Inspection —

Intell. —

Laboratory —

Plan. & Eval. —

Spec. Inv. —

Training —

Legal Coun. —

Telephone Rm. —

Director Sec'y —

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

WICK/TAL

RM 5-WOC/8

KS

✓ S. Phillips - 4063 jk

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 15, 1975

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: JAMES DANIEL O'FLAHERTY
STAFF EMPLOYEE - U. S. SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/HIG

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
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Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

At 2 PM on August 14, 1975, the writer accompanied Judge Tyler, Deputy Attorney General, and Richard Thornburgh, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to a meeting with Senator Church, Chairman of the above-mentioned Committee and Bill Miller, Staff Director for the Committee. Also present from CIA were William Colby, Director, and Mitchell Rogovin, Counsel for Mr. Colby.

Judge Tyler informed Senator Church the purpose of the visit was to inform him concerning the activities of captioned individual who had allegedly made a copy of a CIA document which contained information relating to the CIA involvement in the Chilean situation and discussed Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington as potentially involving himself in connection with this matter at the behest of CIA. The document was classified "Secret/Sensitive - Eyes Only." He was further informed he had displayed this document to two individuals not identified to the Chairman one of whom brought this matter to our attention at which time it was also alleged that subject had made this document available to a member of the staff of Representative Morris K. Udall of Arizona. Subject indicated to our source that he had done so thinking that it might assist Udall in his Presidential aspirations and for use against Jackson whom the subject considered was a threat to Udall's chances of obtaining the Democratic nomination.

The Chairman was also informed that upon being challenged by one of the sources as to the morality and legality of his actions the subject is alleged to have stated that while his actions may have been illegal he did not consider it immoral.

The Chairman and Mr. Miller were both disturbed at receiving this information indicating that they had come along so far without any such incident such as this or any leaks from the Committee or staff. The Chairman stated that he would be willing to cooperate in any manner in order to have this matter resolved at the earliest possible date and requested that the investigation in this matter be pursued. He stated full cooperation would be forthcoming from him and his Staff Director Mr. Miller and inquired as to the proposed course of action to be taken. Judge Tyler

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Wannall 3 ENCLOSURE

NPC:gt (4)

LEGAL COUNSEL

Memo to the Director
Re: James Daniel O'Flaherty

deferred to the writer to outline future steps in this matter and the Chairman was informed in order to resolve this as promptly as possible it would first be necessary with the assistance of Mr. Miller to ascertain without arousing anyone's suspicions whether or not the document displayed to our sources existed in the files of the Senate Select Committee. Should such a document exist our next procedure would be to promptly interview the subject and the ^{OTHER} individual to whom this document had been displayed (not the original source). These interviews would be conducted simultaneously; however, it was pointed out that the other party to be interviewed was not in the immediate area but an Agent could be sent and this action coordinated to prevent the possibility of contact by subject with the other individual before such interview was handled.

The Chairman inquired of Judge Tyler as to the prosecutive action in a case of this type and Judge Tyler responded that Mr. Thornburgh would review the situation after all the facts had been fully developed and make a determination. Judge Tyler however did indicate that should the violation involve the espionage law without having all the facts and with what we have to date, he would be highly doubtful that a prosecutive case would exist but reserved final determination as to when all the facts were known. Senator Church indicated that irrespective the rules of the Committee would require the immediate dismissal of subject should it be determined that he had in fact acted as alleged.

Subsequently, arrangements were made with the Staff Director, Mr. Miller, for a determination to be made of the existence of the document and this was accomplished on the afternoon of August 14, 1975. Pertinent is the fact that the document in the files of the Committee did not contain a date which apparently had been omitted in the duplicating process and our original source in this matter stated that the document exhibited to her by the subject contained no date whereas the document obtained from CIA files and exhibited to her upon interview previously did contain a date.

Later in the afternoon of August 14, 1975, arrangements were made with the Staff Director Miller for Agents of the Washington Field Office to conduct an interview with subject at approximately 11:00 AM on Friday, August 15, 1975, in space to be provided by Miller for this purpose. An Agent of the Washington Field Office familiar with this matter departed Washington in the early AM of August 15th for Nashville to interview the other individual to whom this document was displayed simultaneous to the time the interview was to be conducted with subject. The above arrangements were brought to the attention of Judge Tyler who concurred.

P.A. Miller
This is submitted for record purposes.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/8/75

#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/jlb

_____ was interviewed at _____ temporary residence, _____ Alexandria, Virginia. _____ furnished the following information:

At 7:00 p.m. on July 9 or 10, 1975; JAMES DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, who resides at 1609 Preston Road, Alexandria, Virginia and who is employed by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, visited _____, where _____ was then residing. _____ has known O'FLAHERTY since January, 1974. O'FLAHERTY told _____ that he had been at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that same day, and that he has been going to CIA quite often. On prior occasions, O'FLAHERTY had told _____ that his job with the Senate Select Committee was investigating covert actions by the CIA in Chile.

O'FLAHERTY had a briefcase with him when he came to the apartment. _____ and he were talking when all of a sudden O'FLAHERTY said: "I would like you to see something." O'FLAHERTY then opened his briefcase and took out and handed to _____ what _____ knew was obviously a Xerox copy of a document. He told _____ to read it.

_____ said what O'FLAHERTY gave _____ consisted of more than one page and probably three pages. _____ saw on the bottom

Interviewed on 8/6/75 at Alexandria, Virginia File # WFO 65-12159

by DANIEL J. KIERNAN and
ESAs: DONALD E. STUKEY, II DJK:iab Date dictated 8/7/75

of each page the words "Secret/Sensitive, Eyes Only". Though [redacted] was not positive, [redacted] believes those same words appeared also at the top of each page. At the top of the first page were the words "Central Intelligence Agency". It was a memorandum from someone to someone else. [redacted] could not remember who the addressor or addressee was but said it could have come from a "department" in the CIA to another department therein, rather than from a particular person to another person. [redacted] recalled the word "Subject" appeared in the memorandum.

[redacted] recalled the contents of the document discussed the pros and cons of CIA's approaching Senator HENRY M. JACKSON of Washington to have the Senator involve himself in something having to do with a foreign country. From [redacted] reading, [redacted] got the impression CIA believed it could approach Senator JACKSON because of a favor the CIA had done for him in the past and because the Senator would be receptive to CIA's approach.

[redacted] recollection was that CIA was considering approaching Senator JACKSON to have him do something which was (in [redacted] words) "illicit". [redacted] could not recall what it was that CIA wanted the Senator to do. [redacted] felt it had to do with Chile or some other South American country because O'FLAHERTY previously mentioned to [redacted] that CIA's activities in Chile was the area in which he was working on for the Senate Select Committee.

[redacted] said [redacted] did not read all of the pages carefully and for that reason could not describe the memorandum more fully. [redacted] stated when O'FLAHERTY handed it to [redacted] the first thing [redacted] saw were the words "Secret/Sensitive, Eyes Only". That scared [redacted]. Furthermore, as [redacted] was reading the document O'FLAHERTY was talking with [redacted] so that [redacted] was half reading the document and, at the same time, was half listening to O'FLAHERTY.

[redacted] said he had been going through some CIA files at random and had come across a document which referred to

Senator JACKSON. He had made a Xerox copy of the document and then had returned the document to where he had found it in the files. He then placed the Xerox copy of the document in his pocket and walked away without anyone knowing what he had done.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] had believed O'FLAHERTY had found the document in the files at the CIA and had Xeroxed it there. [REDACTED] did not recall O'FLAHERTY having specifically said the incident took place at CIA. However [REDACTED] recalled O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] when he came with his briefcase to [REDACTED] apartment on July 9 or 10, 1975, that he had been over to CIA earlier that day in connection with his work for the Senate Select Committee.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know how O'FLAHERTY would have been able to go through files at random at CIA and then have Xeroxed a document from such files without anyone knowing of it. For that reason [REDACTED] said O'FLAHERTY might have been speaking of having seen the document in the files of the office of the Senate Select Committee. [REDACTED] was certain he was speaking of coming upon the document as he was going through files in connection with his work for the Senate Select Committee. [REDACTED] was certain also that he had not been looking for the particular document but had come across it at random while going through files. O'FLAHERTY did tell [REDACTED] he obtained the document from CIA files but he did not say where the files were located.

O'FLAHERTY said he had taken the Xerox copy of the document to the office of Representative MORRIS K. UDALL of Arizona and there had shown it to JESSICA (Last Name Unknown) (LNU) whom O'FLAHERTY described as being either Representative UDALL's right hand person in his campaign for the Presidency of the U.S. or as Representative UDALL's Campaign Manager. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was not certain O'FLAHERTY had taken the Xerox copy to Representative UDALL's office on Capitol Hill or to his Campaign Headquarters. [REDACTED] was certain O'FLAHERTY had spoken of having taken the Xerox copy to the office where JESSICA (LNU) worked, wherever that office was located.

[REDACTED] said O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] he had let JESSICA (LNU) copy off, that is make notes, from the Xerox copy and then took the Xerox copy back from her.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] asked O'FLAHERTY why he had Xeroxed the document. O'FLAHERTY replied he wanted to help Representative UDALL. [REDACTED] told O'FLAHERTY it obviously was not all altruism on his part. O'FLAHERTY said if Representative UDALL became President he would be beholden to O'FLAHERTY. He told [REDACTED] also that the information contained in the document should be made known. He said information in the document could be damaging to Senator JACKSON for two reasons, one if it was found out that the Senator had gone through with what the CIA wanted to approach him on and, two, if it became known that he was in this position where CIA felt it could approach him.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] asked O'FLAHERTY how could he find out whether Senator JACKSON had actually helped CIA in this matter. [REDACTED] pointed out the document did not state that Senator JACKSON had helped the CIA. The document only indicated [REDACTED] that CIA had Senator JACKSON in the position where he owed CIA a favor and that the Senator would help CIA. [REDACTED] pointed out the document indicated CIA was of a mind that JACKSON would not refuse. The memorandum did not go further insofar as revealing that Senator JACKSON had helped CIA. The Agency just happened to think that Senator JACKSON would help them. O'FLAHERTY replied it would be no problem to determine whether or not the Senator had helped CIA.

[REDACTED] stated O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] the fact that Senator JACKSON helped CIA in another country, or was helping CIA, or was even in a position to help CIA, would hurt the Senator.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] asked O'FLAHERTY what was the reason he had given the information to Representative UDALL through JESSICA.

According to [REDACTED], O'FLAHERTY replied that Senator JACKSON was Representative UDALL's "foremost worry, if we can find out what happened here, it can hurt (Senator) JACKSON." O'FLAHERTY said Representative UDALL could confront Senator JACKSON with it.

[REDACTED] said O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] he let JESSICA read the Xerox copy and she, JESSICA, did take notes. He said he took the Xerox copy back from JESSICA.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] asked O'FLAHERTY: "Don't you think this is pretty immoral?" O'FLAHERTY answered: "It might be illegal but it is a matter of opinion if it is immoral."

[REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] was so scared that [REDACTED] just skimmed through the Xerox copy. [REDACTED] said they discussed the document for ten minutes after which nothing more was said of it that evening.

[REDACTED] was certain O'FLAHERTY showed [REDACTED] the Xerox copy on either Wednesday, July 9, 1975 or Thursday, July 10, 1975 evening because, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled O'FLAHERTY visited [REDACTED] apartment at [REDACTED] on Saturday evening, July 12, 1975. [REDACTED] had finished [REDACTED] that date. O'FLAHERTY had worked that day at the Senate Select Committee office.

O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] that on the previous night, July 11, 1975, he had shown the Xerox copy of the document to WALLACE KATZ, a friend from Nashville, Tennessee, who had visited WDC from July 8 to 12, 1975 to do some work at the Library of Congress. KATZ had stayed at O'FLAHERTY's residence while in WDC.

[REDACTED] said O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] of the conversation he had KATZ had on the night of July 11, 1975. KATZ had expressed a strong opinion on what O'FLAHERTY had done and had said O'FLAHERTY was being very, very immoral concerning the document. O'FLAHERTY told KATZ he was trying to help Representative UDALL and besides the contents of the document should be made known. O'FLAHERTY told KATZ he had no qualms of telling what was true, regardless of how he had obtained the information. Both O'FLAHERTY and KATZ agreed what O'FLAHERTY had done was illegal. KATZ had felt it was also immoral. KATZ told O'FLAHERTY he was disappointed in him. This hurt O'FLAHERTY.

O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] that KATZ felt O'FLAHERTY was doing it for his own benefit, to get ahead. Also KATZ had pointed out to O'FLAHERTY that the latter on entering employment with the Senate Select Committee had taken an oath to keep confidential what he learned in connection with his duties with the Committee. KATZ told O'FLAHERTY he felt O'FLAHERTY had sort of betrayed a trust.

O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] he and KATZ argued on the night of July 11, 1975. KATZ was upset with what O'FLAHERTY had done and O'FLAHERTY was hurt by his friend's remarks. However the next morning, July 12, 1975, before KATZ left for Nashville, the two made up.

O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] he thought KATZ might have felt the way he did because he might be jealous of O'FLAHERTY's position with the Senate Select Committee. O'FLAHERTY acknowledged KATZ's feelings were also based on moral grounds.

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] asked O'FLAHERTY if KATZ felt O'FLAHERTY was betraying a trust, betraying his position with the Senate Select Committee. O'FLAHERTY said: "You put it correctly. That's the way KATZ felt."

[REDACTED] said [REDACTED] asked O'FLAHERTY if he himself felt he had betrayed his position. O'FLAHERTY replied: "No, I was

only helping a friend." O'FLAHERTY also said he did not believe the contents of the document affected national security. He said he did not think the document rated "Security/Sensitive, Eyes Only" classification.

██████████ said O'FLAHERTY told ██████████ he had come across the document in CIA files. He did not say where the CIA files were actually located. He said he Xeroxed the document, put the original document back in the CIA files and placed the Xerox copy in his pocket. He did say he was at CIA that day.

██████████ said O'FLAHERTY did not indicate to ██████████ that he himself would find out whether Senator JACKSON had actually helped CIA. O'FLAHERTY did say it would not be a problem to find out if the Senator did help CIA. O'FLAHERTY said he did not know exactly how it could be ascertained whether the Senator had helped but, O'FLAHERTY said, this would be no problem.

██████████ recalled ██████████ asked O'FLAHERTY what he was going to do about the Xerox copy of the document. ██████████ asked him where he would put it. ██████████ told him it was not safe to keep the copy around. O'FLAHERTY made a remark in an off-handed manner something to the effect that the only solution was to burn it.

██████████ stated that after their conversation on the evening of July 12, 1975, ██████████ and O'FLAHERTY never again discussed the matter of the CIA document again with each other.

██████████ stated ██████████ would be able to recognize the document if ██████████ saw it again.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

3/11/75

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[redacted] was shown a copy of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum dated February 21, 1973, consisting of five pages and bearing the heading "Memorandum For: The Director of Central Intelligence," and "Subject: Proposed CIA Response to Request for Information Which Have Been Received From the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations," by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Upon viewing the document and reading its contents, [redacted] made the following observations:

The form of the first page of the document is familiar to [redacted]. However, the content of the three paragraphs on page one is not familiar to [redacted]. [redacted] noted that upon viewing the document that in [redacted] previous statement to the interviewing Special Agents on August 6, 1975, [redacted] said the document was directed from one person to another person, or possibly from one department in CIA to another department in CIA. However, after viewing this document, [redacted] believes the memorandum was directed either from one job title to another job title or from one department to another department in CIA. [redacted] said [redacted] is now certain that no person's name appeared in the heading of the document DANIEL O'FLAHERTY displayed to [redacted].

[redacted] pointed out that [redacted] does not recall the date in the upper right hand corner of the document or the notation, "12 IMPDET SL by 051991" in the lower right hand corner of page one.

[redacted] said that it was [redacted] impression that probably the discussion of Senator JACKSON began on the first page of the document [redacted] read and carried on to page two of the document.

[redacted] said the paragraph which is numbered "5(A)" on the second page and carries on to page three of the document is familiar to [redacted]. [redacted] further noted that the paragraph numbered "5(B)" is also familiar to [redacted].

Interviewed on 2/18/75 at Washington, D.C. File # 100-5512143

by DONALD E. STUBBS, II, and
by DANIEL J. KENNEDY Date dictated 3/11/75

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ENCLOSURE

62-116395-549

#MDR 16
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The first sentence of paragraph 5(A) reads, "The Legislative Council be authorized to sound out Senator JACKSON on the prospects of CIA being able to obtain either Senator STENNIS or Senator SYMINGTON's assistance in arranging for the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the problems of how CIA sources and techniques could be protected before the agency proceeds further with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations."

██████████ said ██████████ does not recall the references to Senators STENNIS or SYMINGTON, but ██████████ is positive that ██████████ has read the portions of the sentence which states, "To consider the problems of how CIA sources and techniques could be protected," in the document O'FLAHERTY showed ██████████.

The next sentence in paragraph 5(A) reads, "In this connection it should be noted that Senator JACKSON has a proven record of supporting CIA and in the past his advice on how CIA might handle a particular piece of Congressional business has been sound."

██████████ said ██████████ is positive that ██████████ read the words, "In this connection it should be noted that Senator JACKSON has a proven record of supporting CIA in the past..." in the document O'FLAHERTY displayed to ██████████.

The next sentence of paragraph 5(A) reads, "In addition, Senator JACKSON is discreet and can be counted on not to comment further on what he learns about CIA or 'ITT' actions in Chile in 1970."

██████████ stated that although ██████████ does not recall the reference to "ITT" in the sentence, ██████████ is positive that ██████████ read the words, "Senator JACKSON is discreet and can be counted on not to comment further on what he learns about CIA," in the document O'FLAHERTY gave ██████████ to read.

The second sentence after the one described in paragraph 5(A) reads, "In short, a risk would be taken for

sensitive information would be surfaced to a Senator with there being no guarantee he would be helpful.

He said [redacted] specifically recalls reading the words, "A risk would be taken for sensitive information would be surfaced to a Senator," in the document given to [redacted] by O'FLAHERTY.

The first two sentences of paragraph 5(B) of the document states, "If Senator JACKSON believes that it would be useful, let the Library to approach Senator STEWART or Senator SYLVESTER, then such an approach should be made. Perhaps Senator JACKSON could pave the way for such a contact."

[redacted] stated that [redacted] specifically recalls this sentence, "Perhaps Senator JACKSON could pave the way for such a contact," in the document O'FLAHERTY showed [redacted].

[redacted] observed that paragraph "5(C)" on pages three and four of the document is similar to [redacted]. [redacted] noted the term "Executive Privilege" on page four, paragraph 5(C) and said that if [redacted] had read this paragraph this term would have caught [redacted] eye.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] does not recall having read paragraph number "6" and "7" on page four of the document.

[redacted] said the last page, page five, is absolutely not familiar to [redacted] and [redacted] does not recall any signatures on the last page of this document.

On page five, [redacted] noted that there were portions of the words "Yes Only" at the very top of the page. [redacted] noted these words did not appear at the top of the page of any other pages shown to [redacted]. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was not looking about the appearance of these words being at the top of page five that [redacted] recalled of having seen the same words at the top of one of the pages in the document O'FLAHERTY showed [redacted].

[redacted] said [redacted] did not remember the document O'FLANNERY showed [redacted] being as long as the document the interview Special Agents showed [redacted]. [redacted] now believes the document O'FLANNERY showed [redacted] consisted of only three pages [redacted] that approximately two-thirds of the third page was blank.

[redacted] recalled having previously stated on August 6, 1975, [redacted] remembered seeing the words "Central Intelligence Agency" at the top of the first page of the document O'FLANNERY showed [redacted]. Upon reviewing the document displayed by the interviewing Special Agents, [redacted] stated that the words "Memorandum For: The Director of Central Intelligence" may have been at the top of page one of the document O'FLANNERY showed [redacted].

[redacted] was making this statement because [redacted] recalled as soon as [redacted] had started to read the document shown to [redacted] by O'FLANNERY, [redacted] recognized that it was a CIA document.

[redacted] pointed out that the classification "Secret/Sensitive Eyes Only" appears on the bottom of all pages of the document shown to [redacted] by the interviewing Special Agents was identical to the classification which [redacted] had observed on the bottom of all of the pages on the document shown to [redacted] by O'FLANNERY.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] would not be able to state whether or not the document shown to [redacted] by the interviewing Special Agents was identical to the document shown to [redacted] by O'FLANNERY. [redacted] stated that [redacted] would not rule it out as being identical to the document shown to [redacted] by O'FLANNERY, but, on the other hand, [redacted] could not say it was the same document. [redacted] stated that it is possible the two documents [redacted] is identical. However, [redacted] added, [redacted] did not know how to reconcile the fact that the O'FLANNERY showed [redacted] seemed to have been

much shorter. [redacted] stated, in reference to the document shown so [redacted] by the Special Agents, [redacted] first impression on reading page one that [redacted] did not recognize it except for the form of the heading. [redacted] stated, "When I saw familiar words at the end of page two and the top of page three, [redacted] stated that if the information contained in paragraphs '5(A)' and '5(B)' of the document shown to [redacted] by the interviewing Special Agents does not exist in any other CIA document, then the document shown to [redacted] by the Special Agents is identical to the document shown to [redacted] by O'Flaherty."

[redacted] stated that one of [redacted] reservations in coming forth with the information in this matter was that [redacted] had not read the document O'FLAHERTY stated in detail.

[redacted] stated, "O'FLAHERTY gave me the document. I am not used to reading such things. I did not wish to appear bored." [redacted] "skimmed" the document and said it was possible [redacted] did not read the first page.

[redacted] said, "It seems where Senator JACKSON came in was on the first page; I remember them turning to the second page."

[redacted] stated it is recollection that the first page [redacted] read of the document O'FLAHERTY showed [redacted] had a 'lead in' paragraph about a problem CIA had and subsequent paragraphs related to Senator JACKSON.

[redacted] stated as [redacted] was reading the document, O'FLAHERTY was talking to [redacted]. O'FLAHERTY told [redacted] that it was evident that CIA had a problem they wanted to talk to Senator JACKSON about. The Senator had a "proven record", CIA would have to tell the Senator what happened.

O'FLAHERTY told [redacted] the fact that CIA had done something "illicit" and needed help, and the fact CIA felt JACKSON could be counted on, merited investigation. O'FLAHERTY said the fact that they had to call on Senator JACKSON indicated to him (O'FLAHERTY) that CIA's activities were not legal.

[redacted] stated [redacted] thought O'FLAHERTY had obtained the document on the same day he showed it to [redacted]. He showed it to [redacted] on either July 9 or July 10, 1975. O'FLAHERTY did not specifically state when he had obtained it, but he did tell [redacted] that he had seen at CIA that day (the day he showed it to [redacted]). He said he obtained it from "CIA files" and then had xeroxed it and put the original back. He did not state where the "CIA files" were located.

[redacted] stated the reason [redacted] believed O'FLAHERTY showed [redacted] the document on the same day he obtained it was that he had seen [redacted] the previous day and never mentioned it.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 8/8/75

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[REDACTED], permanent residence [REDACTED], and temporary residence, [REDACTED], was interviewed on August 6, 1975, concerning an allegation she had made of misuse of a classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document on the part of JAMES DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, an employee of the United States (U.S.) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Set forth below is information furnished by [REDACTED] on August 6, 1975, concerning her background and her relationship to O'FLAHERTY:

[REDACTED] stated she derived her U.S. citizenship through her father. When she was fourteen, [REDACTED] moved from Curacao to San Francisco, California, with her family. She attended the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee (Sewanee) from January, 1974, to August, 1974, when she transferred to the University of California, at Berkeley (Berkeley), California. She is majoring in Political Science at Berkeley and expects to graduate in February, 1975.

On June 9, 1975, [REDACTED] came to Washington, D. C. (WDC), and enrolled in a law course in the Summer Session of the Georgetown University (GU) School of Foreign Service. She has since completed this course. During her second week at GU she learned through the school of an opening on the staff of the [REDACTED], a non-profit organization, funded through private resources, which is concerned with energy conservation matters. She applied for and got a staff position with [REDACTED] and has been working in [REDACTED] since except for interruptions to prepare for examinations at GU. She had expected to be paid by [REDACTED], but found that she was working as a volunteer.

Following her arrival in WDC, she resided alone at [REDACTED] until the end of July, 1975, when she moved into the residence of family friends, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is taking care of the house while the [REDACTED] are away.

Interviewed on 8/6/75 at Alexandria, Virginia File # WFO 65-12169

SAS DONALD E. STUKEY, II AND
by DANIEL J. KIERNAN DJK:lej Date dictated 8/7/75

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ENCLOSURE

62-116385-549

#made 16

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DATE 10-11-00 BY SP-2 ALM/716

[REDACTED] does not have to be back at Berkeley until September, 1975, and she intends to remain in WDC until then if she can.

[REDACTED] has known JAMES DANIEL O'FLAHERTY since January, 1974, when he was an Instructor of Political Science at the University of the South and she was one of his students. O'FLAHERTY presently resides at 1609 Preston Road, Alexandria, and is employed by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. O'FLAHERTY is married to CYNTHIA KEYWORTH, who goes by her maiden name and who is employed as a writer by "public television" in the WDC area.

[REDACTED] knew CYNTHIA KEYWORTH when the latter was residing with her husband in Sewanee during the period January to August, 1974. KEYWORTH had been involved in the Women's Liberation Movement and had set up a workshop in Sewanee. This had not gone over well at Sewanee which was, in [REDACTED] opinion, a conservative school. [REDACTED] had learned from Sewanee faculty members that it was a consensus of opinion that KEYWORTH was not liked and that she was giving her husband problems insofar as the University was concerned. [REDACTED] explained she was privy to faculty members' thinking inasmuch as her family had been prominently identified with Sewanee for several generations. Her grandfather had been an Episcopalian bishop.

[REDACTED], who is not married, and O'FLAHERTY became friends and by August, 1974, they had reached an understanding that O'FLAHERTY would divorce KEYWORTH and marry [REDACTED] in the Fall of 1974, or in December, 1974. She admitted to having had relations with O'FLAHERTY while at Sewanee.

In August, 1974, [REDACTED] transferred to Berkeley because she felt Sewanee was not offering her the curriculum she wanted. In August, 1974, O'FLAHERTY also left Sewanee, ostensibly on a sabbatical leave but with the intention of coming to WDC, finish his thesis for a doctorate, and, at the same time, to seek employment on Capitol Hill. O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] he wanted to get into politics and if he could find employment in WDC he would resign his position at Sewanee as he no longer desired to teach.

KEYWORTH was away from Sewanee in August, 1974. [REDACTED] believes she was visiting in Arizona.

[REDACTED] remained in touch with O'FLAHERTY while she was in Berkeley and he was in WDC. She made three trips to WDC by air travel to be with him, once toward the end of August, 1974, another time in September, 1974, and again in February, 1975. O'FLAHERTY paid for her air travel on all three occasions.

When [REDACTED] came to WDC on June, 1975, and rented the apartment at 412 3rd Street, N.W., O'FLAHERTY paid half of the rent and frequently visited her, sometimes staying overnight.

O'FLAHERTY had told his wife of his relationship with [REDACTED]. Subsequently, O'FLAHERTY told [REDACTED] his wife was having a nervous breakdown. He told [REDACTED] he could not leave his wife in such a dire state. Finally, when he decided he could see his way through to obtaining a divorce, his wife told him she had cancer. When O'FLAHERTY related this to [REDACTED] she told him to contact his wife's doctor. O'FLAHERTY did this and reported back to [REDACTED] that his wife had not taken tests as yet to determine how serious her condition was. Approximately two weeks ago, [REDACTED] broke off her relationship with O'FLAHERTY. This was done amicably. Both realized O'FLAHERTY was not going to divorce his wife.

Concerning the information she had furnished on August 6, 1975, in which she alleged that O'FLAHERTY had misused a classified government document, [REDACTED] stated it had been rather difficult for her to report this. She said she had known the information since July 9, or 10, 1975, and had not liked the idea that she knew of it.

[REDACTED] stated she generally visits her uncle and aunt, [REDACTED], every weekend. Her uncle is retired from the U.S. Navy and had been in Intelligence with the Navy. He is presently employed as a manager with the [REDACTED] in or near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On one such visit shortly after July 10, 1975, she told her uncle that O'FLAHERTY had shown her a copy of a document pertaining to the CIA. She told her uncle that O'FLAHERTY advised her he had come across a document in CIA files and had made a Xerox copy of the document after which he had returned the document to the CIA file and had walked away with the Xerox copy in his pocket. Her uncle was appalled on hearing this. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] she ought to do something about it. He told her that if she was not going to act on it then he would.

Several days ago while [REDACTED] was trying to make up her mind what to do, she received a telephone call from [REDACTED], who told her that her uncle, [REDACTED], had finally had to do something about it. He had called a friend in the U.S. Navy Intelligence and the latter subsequently notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

[REDACTED] stated the reason why she had delayed furnishing the information herself was that she felt she was in sort of a precarious position. She stated she would like very much for her name to be left out of this matter. She was afraid that if her name was revealed there would be personal repercussions because of:

1. The way in which [REDACTED] learned of the information from O'FLAHERTY.
2. So few people knew of it.
3. O'FLAHERTY's family has connections with people involved.
4. [REDACTED] has been trying to make her way in WDC and this matter might hurt her in that regard.

[REDACTED] stated she wanted to make it perfectly clear her furnishing the information concerning O'FLAHERTY was not a matter of "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned." She said she had no personal feelings against O'FLAHERTY because the latter had decided not to divorce his wife. She said she was furnishing this information because she had felt from the time she first became aware of it on July 9, or 10, 1975, that she should report it. She felt that what O'FLAHERTY had done was not only illegal but immoral and that he had violated a trust by misusing the CIA document.

[REDACTED] stated that O'FLAHERTY's wife's father, ROBERT KEYWORTH, is a close friend of Representative MORRIS UDALL and also of the latter's brother STEWART UDALL. It was through his father-in-law that O'FLAHERTY got introductions to both of the UDALLs and became associated with Representative UDALL in writing position papers for him. [REDACTED] said that O'FLAHERTY's father-in-law has powerful friends in WDC who could make her life miserable.

[REDACTED] advised that O'FLAHERTY told her on July 12, 1975, he had shown the Xerox copy of the CIA document to WALLACE B. KATZ on July 11, 1975, while KATZ was an overnight guest at O'FLAHERTY's residence in WDC. [REDACTED] stated O'FLAHERTY told her KATZ had upset him by calling O'FLAHERTY's conduct concerning the CIA document illegal and immoral. Based on what O'FLAHERTY told her concerning KATZ, [REDACTED] is certain KATZ read the copy of the CIA document more carefully than she had and that KATZ would be better informed of its contents.

[REDACTED] stated she and O'FLAHERTY had known KATZ when the latter had taught at Sewanee in 1974. KATZ is currently residing in Nashville, Tennessee, and is working on his doctorate dissertation. She believes he is working on his dissertation at Vanderbilt University in Nashville. [REDACTED] did not know the address of KATZ but said it was listed in the Nashville telephone directory. She mentioned that if KATZ is contacted by representatives of the FBI, she feels certain he will telephone O'FLAHERTY and advise him of the contact. She said KATZ and O'FLAHERTY are close friends.

The interviewing Special Agents (SAs) read to [REDACTED] from their notes and at the conclusion she stated what she had heard the SAs say was an accurate representation of what she had told them. She stated she did not wish to give a signed statement because she felt that the SAs had accurately noted what she had told them. She stated also that what she had told the SAs was the truth.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar

DATE: 8/13/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -75

- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

On 8/11/75, SA Seymour Phillips advised SA Daly of this Division that former Special Agent Richard L. Millen had been interviewed by the Senate Select Committee and that he had no record that the Committee had requested an interview of Millen nor was there a record that Millen's employment agreement had been waived. It was determined through conversation with Millen that he had not sought a waiver of his existing employment agreement prior to consenting to interview.

On 8/11/75, Steven Blackhurst, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, was advised that Millen had been interviewed without prior notification to the Bureau by the Senate Select Committee. Additionally, Millen had not sought or received a waiver from any existing employment agreement. It was pointed out to Blackhurst that while the Committee reserved in special circumstances the right to interview former employees without previously notifying the Bureau, it would appear that in this particular instance this was not warranted. In a subsequent conversation this was brought to the attention of Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

On 8/12/75, John W. Bliff, Task Force Director on Domestic Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee, telephonically contacted SA Daly of this Division and expressed his regrets that the Bureau had not received prior notification of the interview of Millen. He stated, while the Committee had reserved the option to interview former employees without prior notification of the Bureau, he did not feel that this particular interview was in that category. He indicated he would take steps to insure that this problem did not recur.

RECOMMENDATION:

Action. Information.

PVD:lad
(8)

(Richard L. Millen)

LEGAL COUNSEL



SEP 4 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

REQUIRES
LARGE
BULKY
ON
LOCATE

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

August 18, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/14/00 BY SP2 ALM/HK

Reference is made to August 5, 1975, superseding request for specified FBI materials, which request was received on that date from the SSC.

Enclosed is a memorandum for forwarding to the Committee which responds to requests identified in above communication as Roman numeral III., Part D., Item 8., and Roman numeral IV., Part A., Items 1. through 4. Also enclosed for your records is a copy of above memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures - 42

62-116395

EX 104

REQ. 21

62-116395-547

9 AUG 21 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

TJM:1hb/1hb
(11)

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

43 ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

This document is not to be released or referred to your report and is not for dissemination outside your agency. It is the property of the FBI and is to be returned to the FBI without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wainall
- 1 - Mr. V. V. Kolombatovic

August 18, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: MATERIAL RELATING TO INSPECTIONS OF
ALL FBI FOREIGN LIAISON POSTS IN 1971

SPECIFIED MATERIALS RELATING TO FBI
LEGAL ATTACHE OPERATIONS 1970-1971

Reference is made to superseding request for FBI
materials set forth in SSC request dated August 5, 1975.

In accordance with requests contained in
referenced communication identified as Roman numeral III.,
Part D., Item 8., and Roman numeral IV., Part A., Items 1.
through 4., there are enclosed FBI documents believe
responsive to these inquiries.

With respect to Roman numeral IV., Part A., Item 2.,
asking for materials pertaining to conversations between
Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Hoover in December, 1970, no record
of such conversations could be located in FBI files. However,
a letter dated December 11, 1970, relating to a November 10,
1970, conversation between these two individuals is being
furnished.

With respect to request Roman numeral IV., Part A.,
Item 4., a search of FBI records failed to locate any
material pertaining to a conference with the President
regarding foreign liaison operations in June, 1971.

Enclosures - 40
ENCLOSURE
1 - The Attorney General

TJM:lhblhb
(10)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE AG

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO 954-546

RE: MATERIAL RELATING TO INSPECTIONS OF ALL FBI FOREIGN
LIAISON POSTS IN 1971

SPECIFIED MATERIALS RELATING TO FBI LEGAL ATTACHE
OPERATIONS 1970-1971

NOTE:

Roman numeral III., Part D., Item 8., requests material pertaining to inspections of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from former Director Hoover to former Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections. Roman numeral IV., Part A., Items 1. through 4., requests materials pertaining to conversations between former Director Hoover, the President, and Dr. Kissinger in December, 1970, as well as materials relating to contact between FBI and State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970. Additionally, SSC-requested materials pertain to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June, 1971.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 8/18/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee. Material
Document: IV-A, 1-4 relating to inspections of all FBI
Foreign Liaison Posts in 1971; Specified
materials relating to FBI Legal Attache Oprs
1970-1971. (8/5/75 request) FBI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul W. Kelly Date: 8/18/75

Received by: Frank P. Moore

Title: _____

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mde/b
16-13-00 SP2 ALM/8/75

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NO. SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

8/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SSC
<input type="checkbox"/>	HSC

31

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 8/5/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)

S

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)

Liaison, foreign

#mde16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-13-00 BY SP2 ALM/JTB

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Letter dated 12/11/70, relating to a 11/10/70 conversation
between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Hoover. Material pertaining
to inspections of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in
1971.

62-116395

FMK:fmk
(4)ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

f 1 Woc

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

III - D - 8

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/STG

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Tolson ☒
Felt ☒
Sullivan ☒
Mohr ☒
Bishop ☒
Callahan ☒
Casper ☒
Conrad ☒
Dalbey ☒
Gale ☒
Rosen ☒
Tavel ☒
Walters ☒
Soyars ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 31, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE

BEIRUT, LEBANON

INSPECTOR PAUL J. MOHR

8/9 - 13/71

SUMMARY

Official: Theodore A. Korontjis, Legal Attache (Legat) since 12/18/70. First inspection; office opened 12/18/70 at time of expansion of foreign offices.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Excellent. The new office of the Legal Attache is located on the 5th floor of the American Embassy, which is convenient to police, agency, and key contacts; well organized, attractive and operating efficiently. No Bureau automobiles. Security regulations receiving close attention.

Investigative Operations - Excellent. Office covers only Lebanon. Active case load 7/31/71 - 26. Delinquency consistently low. 1 Bureau subject located. No recoveries or deportations effected. Office established primarily for purpose of collecting high-level political intelligence for dissemination to the White House. Legat highly successful in this assignment. From January, 1971, to July, 1971, Beirut Office submitted 53 items for possible dissemination - 29 sent to White House. Total items submitted and number disseminated rank high among all Legats. Legat encouraged to continue. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Very Good. Chief Clerk's Office functioning efficiently and well organized. No misfiled index cards detected and form errors low. Project and pending work current. Retypes low, stenographic production high. Confidential expenditures controlled closely.

Personnel Matters - Excellent. Present complement of one Agent and one clerk-stenographer considered adequate. Legat instructed to follow work load closely. Legat not overweight, on limited duty, probation or unavailable. Morale high. Overtime productive and essential.

Enclosure sent 9-1-71

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel File Theodore A. Korontjis

PJM:bhg (6) 1971

~~SECRET~~ CONTINUED

Classified by 62-116395-547
Exempt from GDS Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Beirut

~~SECRET~~

Contacts - Excellent. Legat, in 8 months, overcoming obstacles of opening a new office, developed a wide range of contacts in police and government agencies. In addition Legat developed several high-level confidential sources who furnish high volume of intelligence information. Has interested Lebanese police in National Academy and instrumental in having 2 Lebanese police officers attend 88th Session of FBI National Academy. Officials contacted by Inspector warmly praised Director, FBI and Beirut Office personnel. Dr. Charles Malik, former President of United Nations General Assembly and now professor, American University of Beirut, was highly complimentary concerning Director and stated he has read all the Director's books and concurred with Director's anti-communist stance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Theodore A. Korontjis, GS-15 at \$25,867, aged 42, veteran, fully available, not on probation. Legal Attache Beirut since 12/18/70. Korontjis is an enthusiastic, dedicated, hard-working Agent. He has an excellent personality, aggressive and highly respected. Makes an excellent appearance and is unusually effective in developing contacts under difficult circumstances. Fully qualified to continue as Legat. A letter is attached for approval summarizing the inspection findings.

OK.
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2. In view of highly successful results in obtaining items of high-level political intelligence information which have been disseminated to White House, it is recommended the Beirut Office be continued.

OK- ✓
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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 nm/276*
ON *10/26/00*

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan _____
Callahan _____
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Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : MR. TOLSON

~~SECRET~~

DATE: August 31, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE

BERN, SWITZERLAND

INSPECTOR FLETCHER D. THOMPSON

8/12 - 16/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Official: Henry D. Grush, Legal Attache (Legat) since 12/5/62. Last inspection: 4/14 - 18/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Excellent (Last Inspection - Very Good).

Office located on fourth floor of Embassy Building in city limits of Bern. Marine Guards on duty in building lobby after working hours and periodic security checks made of our space. Office is well maintained, attractive and secure. Additional contiguous space approved to accommodate new communications equipment. No Bureau cars assigned.

REC-136

67-581753-1-44

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office covers Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Austria previously handled but taken over by Bonn Office 2/71. Active case load 7/31/71, 78, down from 99 last inspection, but average over 12-month period comparable with other offices and above previous 12-month period; delinquency below average 11 of 12 months. Number of cases originating in Bern Office and number of cases closed showed decline. Inspector instructed Legat to make certain all available cases are received and that cases are promptly handled and closed. Accomplishments for past year include 7 fugitive and/or Selective Service delinquents located, 4 deportations, and nearly \$300,000 in recoveries. Twenty Security Index subjects known to have visited or resided in Switzerland since last inspection; 15 other security subjects known to be residing in territory. High volume of work in Bern Office is of criminal nature involving large amounts of money deposited in Swiss banks. Treaty of mutual legal aid between United States and Switzerland is under active consideration and, if enacted, will give us same right of access to funds in banks as enjoyed by Swiss Police. (Will still have to show funds are necessary to prove crime). Embassy officials optimistic that treaty will be signed in near future. Legat instructed to follow closely. Inspector issued specific and positive series of steps which Legat is to

Enclosure *sent 8-31-71*

1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)

1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)

1 - Personnel File Henry D. Grush

FDT:bhg (6)

107194

ENCLOSURE

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CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Bern

take in effort to develop additional information concerning activities of Black Panther Party (BPP) in Switzerland and to gain access to data concerning accounts in Swiss banks used for funding BPP.

While five high-level intelligence items submitted by Bern have been disseminated to White House, Legat instructed to devote more time and penetrative attention to this important program; Legat has positive attitude toward program. He is of opinion large majority of accomplishments, whether in criminal, security or intelligence field, would not have been possible without presence of Legat. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office staffed by experienced Legat and one clerk-stenographer; well administered. Chief Clerk's Office operating efficiently; form errors below average and down from last inspection. Stenographic production substantially above average with retypes low. Continued close attention to all administrative operations stressed.

Personnel Matters - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Complement of one Agent and one clerk-stenographer (same as last inspection) considered adequate to handle liaison and other responsibilities. Legat agrees. Agent not overweight, unavailable or on limited duty. Close professional working relationship between Agent and clerk-stenographer; morale appears high.

Contacts - Very Good (Last Inspection - Excellent). Legat has congenial and productive liaison with wide range of agencies and individuals, both American and foreign. Instructions issued to strengthen liaison to insure Legat is promptly notified concerning proposed visits to U. S. by high Swiss officials in order that any courtesies which might be appropriate in furtherance of Bureau's best interests can be arranged (Legat was not promptly advised of plans of Swiss Attorney General to visit U. S. and Bureau headquarters). All persons met by Inspector expressed high regard for and confidence in Director, FBI and our personnel in Bern.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Henry D. Grush, GS-17 at \$34,716, aged 56, veteran, not on probation, Legal Attache since 12/5/62. Is reserved, businesslike and dependable. Most knowledgeable concerning Swiss government, laws and people. Grush is linguist capable of handling several languages. Qualified to continue as Legal Attache. Attached is letter advising Legat of inspection findings.

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Bern

~~SECRET~~

2. The Bern Office covers Switzerland, which is a stable and conservative country. It may not offer the same potential for high-level intelligence as do some other territories; but positive items have been developed and should continue. Swiss banks have long been recognized as the repository for funds illegally acquired by Americans, now including some of the Black Panthers. We have made some progress in gaining access to these funds and findings of Inspector (together with prospects for signing mutual legal aid treaty between Switzerland and U. S.) indicate further success through close personal liaison is possible and probable. The existing case load, combined with these other considerations, justifies continuance of our Legat in Bern. It is, therefore, recommended that the office of the Legal Attache in Bern be continued with the present complement of one Agent and one clerk-stenographer.

V 7 JPHW P

OK.
h

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

MR. TOLSON

DATE: September 7, 1971

FROM: J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
BONN, GERMANY
INSPECTOR FLETCHER D. THOMPSON
8/17 - 22/71

Tolson _____
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Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
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Dalbey _____
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Ponder _____
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Soyars _____
Telo. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/17TG
ON 10/26/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Officials: George A. Van Noy, Legal Attache (Legat) since 9/19/55. Floyd R. Peters, Assistant Legat since 6/28/70 and Number One Man since 2/19/71. (John C. F. Morris, Assistant Legat 12/29/62 - 7/31/71). Last inspection: 4/20 - 27/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Space on sixth floor of American Embassy Building in suburb of Bonn. Office is secure with Marine Guards on duty in building lobby after working hours and periodic security checks made of our space. Office is neat, well arranged and maintained, but extremely crowded. Legat instructed to pursue negotiations with Embassy officials for additional space, contiguous to existing space if possible, but office may have to move to another floor in same building. Legat to furnish estimates and recommendations to Bureau before making any commitments. No Bureau cars assigned.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Excellent). West Germany, the Netherlands and Austria (since 12/70) covered by Bonn Office. Active case load (majority of security nature) 328 as of 7/31/71 (248 last inspection). Over 12-month period case load and cases closed per Agent well above average each month; delinquency below average each month. SENSITIVE SOURCE AND METHOD

, continues to produce valuable material, including information on Left Wing organizations in U. S. and travel of Security Index subjects and communists to Eastern Bloc. SENSITIVE SOURCE AND METHOD

) Since April, 1971, necessary to transmit some items to Bureau in bulk without benefit of thorough analysis in Bonn Office. Inspector

Enclosure 9-8-71

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files George A. Van Noy and Floyd R. Peters

FDT:bhg (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Bonn

determined experienced clerical employee (Miss Cuddy) capable of reviewing and processing much of this material. Assignment of this clerk-stenographer full time to project would release Agent personnel to handle other important responsibilities, primarily in the field of gathering high-level intelligence (HILEV). Since last inspection 78 Security Index subjects known to have visited or resided in Bonn territory; 76 other security subjects known to be residing these countries. Sources providing coverage on activities. In criminal field Bonn reported location of 22 fugitives and/or Selective Service delinquents in last 12 months. Valuable information also developed in several car theft ring cases, major thefts in U. S. and activities in Black Panther movement in Algeria. While 7 HILEV items worthy of dissemination to the White House (3 in August) have been submitted, there is a definite need for expansion and intensification. Positive program for this purpose outlined. Legat of definite opinion great majority accomplishments in all areas achieved only because of presence our personnel and would not have been possible through normal diplomatic channels. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office is capably administered. Chief Clerk's Office operating efficiently and work current. Stenographic production above average even though time spent on clerical duties is high. Continued close attention to all administrative functions stressed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Personnel complement 3 Agents and 4 clerk-stenographers (2 Agents and 3 clerk-stenographers last inspection). Thorough analysis by Inspector of work load, types of cases, and experience of personnel determined Agents required to spend too much time in office handling high volume of security matters (~~SENSITIVE SOURCE~~). Overtime essential, productive and equitably shared. Time in office higher than should be due to above- ~~SENSITIVE METHOD~~ . Morale appears high. Language ability Agent personnel satisfactory.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Productive and cordial liaison maintained with diversified contacts, both American and foreign, throughout territory. Legat recognizes need for cultivating and expanding contacts, especially in HILEV field. Instructed to do so. All contacts expressed highest regard for and confidence in Director and our Bonn personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. George A. Van Noy, GS-16 at \$33,757, aged 57, nonveteran, not on probation. Legat since 9/19/55; fully available. Makes excellent personal appearance;

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Bonn

quiet, but engaging personality; effective Bureau representative; highly respected by associates and others with whom he has contact. Fully qualified to continue as Legat. If approved, attached letter to Van Noy will summarize inspection findings.

JWP

2. Floyd R. Peters, GS-15 at \$25,059, aged 54, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 6/28/70, Number One Man since 2/19/71. Peters is a dedicated, hard-working Agent who is capably discharging his responsibilities. Qualified to continue as Assistant Legat and for further administrative advancement commensurate with needs of Bureau; fully available.

JWP

3. The Bonn Office handles a high volume of cases in security, criminal, liaison, intelligence and related areas. Legat feels, and inspection confirms, that great majority of accomplishments achieved only because of presence of our personnel on the scene. It is recommended, therefore, that office of Legal Attache, Bonn, be continued.

C.R.
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ☒
Felt ☒
Sullivan ☒
Mohr ☒
Bishop ☒
Brennan ☒
Callahan ☒
Casper ☒
Conrad ☒
DeLoach ☒
Gale ☒
Ponder ☒
Rosen ☒
Tavel ☒
Walters ☒
Soyars ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

~~SECRET~~

DATE: August 12, 1971

DJD

#mpe16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/216
ON 10/26/00

INSPECTION

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGAT) -
(BUENOS AIRES), ARGENTINA
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON
7/29 - 8/3/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Officials: John J. Wachter, Legal Attache since 3/22/67; Warren C. de Brueys, Assistant Legal Attache since 12/19/70 and Number One Man since 2/4/71. Last Inspection: 12/7 - 11/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office located fourth floor, U. S. Embassy, downtown Buenos Aires. Space secure and attractively maintained. Additional space acquired since last inspection to accommodate additional personnel. No security violations. Need for security stressed. Bureau car well maintained - no safety defects. Operating and repair costs above averages; arrival of new car expected shortly which should reduce costs. Economy stressed. Minor housekeeping delinquencies detected ordered corrected.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office covers Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay and is responsible for developing intelligence information regarding Marxist regime in neighboring Chile. 2 Agents added since last inspection to handle added territory and expanded coverage. Case load 7/31/71, 280 (277 active), up from 95 last inspection. Delinquency and case closings low. Increased case turnover encouraged. High percentage (73%) of cases generated by Legat personnel, 63% of case load is security matters. No substantive errors detected. Suggestion made to aid in espionage matter. 14 fugitives and Selective Service delinquents located, 3 deportations effected (down from last inspection), recoveries total \$5,165,350 (up substantially). Confidential sources and official contacts rated excellent and efforts being continued for further expansion of intelligence sources. 48 high-level intelligence (HILEV) items submitted, of which 22 furnished to White House. Estimated 90% of accomplishments would not have been achieved in absence of FBI representatives.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office functioning smoothly and efficiently with low project work and pending work.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
1 - Personnel Files John J. Wachter and Warren C. de Brueys

Classified by 6282 Wod
Exempt from automatic
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Buenos Aires, Argentina

File destruction current. Form errors and misfiled index cards below averages. Stenographic pool has high production, no delinquency or retyped pages. Confidential fund properly maintained. Travel, contact and per diem expenses up, but consistent with expanded coverage and increased personnel.

Personnel Matters - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Personnel complement of 3 Agents and 3 clerk-stenographers (up from one Agent and one clerk-stenographer last inspection due to expanded coverage and added territory) adequate but not excessive. All Agents proficient in necessary foreign languages. Overtime high but necessary, productive and equitably shared. Morale high.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Quality contacts developed in highest executive and operational levels of intelligence and law enforcement groups in territory. Aggressive program for expanded coverage is continuing and high utilization achieved. All persons contacted by Inspector expressed admiration and high esteem for Director, FBI and Buenos Aires personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That office continue due to extent of territory, unrest and potential thereof affecting U. S., plus activities of great interest to White House, statistical accomplishments and further potential.

2. John J. Wachter, GS-16 at \$29,067, aged 53, nonveteran, not on probation, Legal Attache since 3/22/67. Wachter makes excellent personal appearance, is conscientious, hard-working Agent and excellent administrator. He is highly effective and aggressive in his liaison responsibilities and has a substantial grasp of the Bureau's overall operations. Considered highly qualified to continue in present assignment and to have excellent potential for additional responsibilities. Available for transfer or promotion.

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- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Buenos Aires, Argentina

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3. Warren C. de Brueys, GS-15 at \$25,059, aged 50, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legal Attache at Buenos Aires since 12/19/70. Mr. de Brueys makes an excellent personal appearance, is conscientious, hard working and aggressive. He meets people well and has developed a number of contacts valuable to the Bureau. He has an excellent knowledge of the Bureau's work and is considered highly qualified to continue in his present position. He is interested in and completely available for any assignment.

4. Attached for approval is a letter advising the Legal Attache of the inspection findings.

SEE ADDENDUM -- NEXT PAGE

- 3 -

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson, from Mr. Ponder, 8/12/71
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Buenos Aires, Argentina

ADDENDUM (WCS:csb), 8/13/71:

The conclusion to continue this office, without any qualification, is one with which I cannot agree. As I have previously indicated, I think the office should be kept open until the present Ambassador leaves, and then it should be considered as one that could be closed, with no damage done to this country. After all, no damage was done to the country before the office was ever opened.

This could be said about all our foreign offices. H
The inspection report points out that 90% of the accomplishments would not have been achieved in the absence of FBI representatives. How much of the 90% done by FBI representatives was absolutely necessary to the well-being of this country?

I think quite substantially. H
To repeat, I cannot agree with the conclusion to continue this office.

W. ~~SULLIVAN~~ SULLIVAN

I do not concur. H

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT/crt 8-16-71

As with the others, the overall question of continuance or expansion of Foreign Offices will be presented in one memorandum when all the inspections are completed.

OK. I approve continuation of Buenos Aires, Argentina office. H

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 26, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
CARACAS, VENEZUELA

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON

8/9 - 12/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/176
ON 10/16/00

SUMMARY

Officials: Joseph S. Leo, Legal Attache (Legat) since 12/14/70; Gordon F. Ellison, Assistant Legat since 12/23/70 and Number One Man since 5/18/71. First inspection since office opened 12/14/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good. Office temporarily located third floor, U. S. Embassy, commercial section of Caracas. Space secure, well organized and neatly maintained. Office to move to four rooms on sixth floor of U. S. Embassy in September, 1971. No security violations since office opened. Need for security stressed. No Bureau cars - Agents authorized to use personally owned. No accidents. Minor housekeeping delinquencies detected, ordered corrected.

Investigative Operations - Very Good. Office covers Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, French Guiana, Netherlands Antilles, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago. Case load 7/31/71, 98; (all active) up from 33 - 1/31/71, end of first full month of operation. No delinquency and case closings low. Increased case turnover encouraged. High percentage (65.3%) of cases generated by Legat personnel. 32.6% of case load criminal cases, 19.3% security matters. Statistical accomplishments - favorable; 12 fugitives and 3 Selective Service Act delinquents located, 1 deportation effected and recoveries total \$11,970. 25 high-level intelligence (HILEV) submissions made, of which 12 disseminated to White House. Instructed to increase coverage outside Venezuela and to broaden and increase intelligence coverage especially in HILEV Program. Organization of territory realigned to accomplish this. Estimated about 85% of accomplishments would not have been achieved in absence of FBI representatives. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Very Good. Chief Clerk's Office functioning smoothly and efficiently with no project work and low pending work. File destruction current.

Enclosure sent 8-26-71

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files Joseph S. Leo and Gordon F. Ellison

ACL:bhg (6)

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Caracas

Form errors and misfiled index cards below averages. Clerk-stenographers have high production; no delinquency or retyped pages. Confidential Fund in balance and properly maintained. Travel, contact and per diem expenses consistent with efficient, productive operation. Suggestion made for strengthening accountability for items disseminated. Format used in letters to outside agencies corrected.

Personnel Matters - Excellent. Two Agents (adequate) assigned have vast territory to cover and source coverage must be increased in certain areas to successfully carry out mission, especially development of HILEV intelligence material. Realignment of territory made to improve coverage. Complement of two clerk-stenographers adequate, but not excessive. Agents proficient in Spanish language. Overtime high but necessary, productive and equitably shared. Morale high.

Contacts - Excellent. Quality contacts developed in highest executive and operating levels of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in territory. Aggressive program for expanded coverage is continuing. All persons contacted by Inspector expressed admiration and esteem for Director, FBI and Caracas personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Legat Office Caracas, operating only since December, 1970, be continued because of accomplishments already realized in HILEV intelligence program, potential for further HILEV development, and for other potential accomplishments which should improve as operation becomes better established. *Qm*

I concur.
At

2. Joseph S. Leo, GS-15 at \$27,483, aged 43, nonveteran, not on probation and Legat at Caracas since 12/14/70. Leo makes excellent personal appearance, is conscientious, hard-working Agent and excellent administrator. He is highly effective and aggressive in his liaison responsibilities and has a substantial grasp of the Bureau's overall operations. Considered highly qualified to continue in present assignment. Attached for approval is a letter advising Legat of inspection findings. *Qm*

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Caracas

3. Gordon F. Ellison, GS-14 at \$20,815, aged 42, nonveteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat at Caracas since 12/23/70 and Number One Man since 5/8/71. Ellison makes a neat appearance, has a pleasant personality and is a conscientious, hard-working Agent. Ellison has made a real contribution to the effectiveness of the office and is considered qualified to continue in his present position.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: September 1, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/STB
OF 10/26/00

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE

COPENHAGEN, DENMARK

INSPECTOR FLETCHER D. THOMPSON

8/23 - 26/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

SUMMARY

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: Richard E. Potocki, Legal Attache (Legat) since 7/6/71 (SA Lawrence McWilliams Legat 12/21/70 - date office opened until 7/5/71); Bertil W. Rolander, Assistant Legat since 12/21/70. No previous inspection.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good. Moved into permanent space third floor, American Embassy, in downtown Copenhagen 8/20/71. When vault completed (now under construction), will meet security requirements. Space convenient to Embassy officials and communications center; well maintained. One security violation since office opened (former Legat solely responsible and transferred). All personnel very security conscious. Absolute necessity for strict adherence to all security regulations strongly emphasized by Inspector. Marine Guard on duty on third floor near our office during working hours and in lobby at other times. Periodic security checks made. No Bureau cars assigned.

Investigative Operations - Very Good. Territory, previously handled out of London, covers Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Active case load of 91 at time of inspection is still below average, but up from 26 in January, 1971. Case closings likewise below average; delinquency low. Accomplishments during first 7 months of operation included 31 fugitives and/or Selective Service delinquents located and one deportation effected. Three of our Security Index subjects visited in countries covered by office during this period and 13 other security subjects reside in territory. Foreign agencies keeping office advised of movements and activities. Legat establishing direct and personal exchange of security and intelligence information with officials in Finland, Norway and Sweden (liaison previously handled through diplomatic channels). This regular personal contact will enhance opportunity for developing high-level (HILEV) intelligence and other information of interest to Bureau. Specific instructions issued regarding need for alertness to Soviet intelligence activities in territory, noting that Soviets have utilized

Enclosure sent 9-2-71 ENCLOSURE 62-116395-547
1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
1 - Personnel Files Richard E. Potocki and Bertil W. Rolander

FD-101 (6) 1971 96

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Copenhagen

Scandinavian countries in the past to initiate operations against the United States; similar instructions issued concerning the Chinese communists. Danish Security Service recently furnished information of value concerning Soviet KGB officer who passed through Denmark. Since Scandinavian countries are recognized haven for draft dodgers and New Left fugitives, Inspector instructed Legat to request background data and photographs of extremist fugitives for alerting cooperative police services in territory. Office is showing steady improvement in providing HILEV information. Only 4 items worthy of dissemination to White House submitted 1/1 - 7/31/71, but 3 such items furnished in August for total of 7. Inspector placed strong emphasis on this phase of Legat's responsibilities. Legat and Assistant recognize importance and have specific plans for expansion of program. Legat of definite opinion majority of accomplishments to date achieved only because of personal contact by our Agents. This is especially noticeable in our Selective Service and Deserter cases in Sweden, where 21 Bureau fugitives and 7 Selective Service delinquents have been located even though official government position is to provide asylum for persons who refuse military service for "humanitarian or political reasons." No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Excellent. Legat is capably administering office, with Chief Clerk's Office running smoothly and work current; stenographic production above average. Continued close attention to all administrative operations emphasized by Inspector.

Personnel Matters - Very Good. Personnel complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerks stenographers. Case load per Agent below average, but substantial increase each month (up from 43 on 6/30/71 to 91 as of 8/25/71). Considering case load, geographical area covered, potential for HILEV and other factors, present complement considered adequate but not excessive to handle responsibilities at this time. Legat instructed to follow closely. Both Agents available; neither overweight or on limited duty. Morale appears high.

Contacts - Excellent. Effective liaison program in effect and being expanded with a number of new contacts established since office opened; others previously developed are becoming more productive. Contacts are diversified, both American and foreign; and are scattered throughout territory covered. All met by Inspector expressed highest regard for Director and FBI as well as our local personnel, and expressed appreciation for having Bureau representatives in Copenhagen.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Richard E. Potocki, GS-15 at \$26,675, aged 47, veteran, completely available, not on probation, previously Assistant Legat at Paris; makes excellent

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Copenhagen

personal appearance, enthusiastic, and confident he can produce desired results in assignment. Respected by working associates and others with whom he does business. Qualified to continue as Legat. Attached for approval is letter to Potocki summarizing inspection findings.

OK.
h

Pm

2. Bertil W. Rolander, GS-14 at \$23,591, aged 45, veteran, completely available, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 12/21/70 (first foreign assignment). Rolander makes excellent impression, is hard worker and is capably absorbing and discharging responsibilities. Qualified to continue as Assistant Legat.

OK.
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3. This office was opened on 12/21/70 with a complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerk-stenographers. The case load and the accomplishments have shown a steady improvement and this favorable trend is now gaining momentum. The results to date in all areas, including HILEV, and the potential for the future are encouraging. It is recommended, therefore, that the Office of Legal Attache in Copenhagen be continued with the present complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerk-stenographers.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2ALM/KTC*

ON *10/26/00*

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 27, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
HONG KONG, BRITISH CROWN COLONY
INSPECTOR MASON G. WORKING 8/7 - 13/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Officials: Daniel A. Grove, Legal Liaison Officer since 4/17/66. Joseph D. Maurice, Assistant Legal Liaison Officer since 12/15/70. Last inspection: 11/23 - 29/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office located on second floor, American Consulate General, downtown Hong Kong. Space modern, attractively maintained and businesslike in appearance. Minor renovation of space contemplated upon receipt of new crypto equipment. Security of space and documents stressed. No security violations and no Bureau automobiles assigned.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office covers Hong Kong, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam and Thailand. Active case load 7/31/71 - 195, down from 214 last inspection (10/31/70). Case load and case closings per Agent exceed other Legat averages and delinquency below Legat averages 8 out of 9 months since last inspection. No substantive errors detected in 285 files reviewed. Investigative matters being closely followed by Legat through established contacts and sources: 64% of case load security; 23% criminal; 13% applicant and other. Hong Kong Communist Party, dominated and controlled by Chinese Communists (CHICOM), continues to gain strength and has established numerous front organizations which propagandize CHICOM political line throughout Kong Kong. Revolutionary tactics and guerrilla activities directed by CHICOMS continuing in Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Matters regarding Chinese aliens and Chinese seamen who desert ships in U. S. carefully analyzed and existing programs receiving close investigative attention. Programs have potential for identifying individuals involved in CHICOM intelligence activity; however, material from resulting investigations in U. S. not available to Legat. One Security Index subject residing in territory. 5 Security Index subjects and 15 security subjects have visited countries covered by Legat since last inspection.

Enclosures: 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
1 - Personnel Files Daniel A. Grove and Joseph D. Maurice

Classified by *SP-2ALM/KTC*
Exempt from GDS
Date of declassification *Indefinite*
33/800

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Hong Kong

42 subjects of Bureau security cases residing in territory. Legat's coverage of Security Index subjects and subjects of security cases effective and Bureau's interests being protected. 52 fugitives and Selective Service delinquents located in territory over past Fiscal Year (50 for previous Fiscal Year). 8 informal deportations effected.

Since inception of high-level intelligence (HILEV) program (9/70), Legat has submitted 15 items to Bureau, only 5 of which have been disseminated to White House. Participation significantly below average of other Legats. Lack of attention to this program highlighted by Inspector and instructions issued to vigorously pursue and develop high-level intelligence sources and contacts. Legat reminded of President's contemplated travel to Peking and instructed to maintain close contact with all individuals in a position to furnish advance information concerning plans of subversive elements and organizations to foment demonstrations in opposition to President's visit.

Administrative Operations - Fair (Last Inspection - Very Good). Chief Clerk's Office well organized, with slight backlog in project and pending work. Misfiled index cards are below average. Form errors slightly above field average, with substantial reduction over previous inspection. Stenographic production high with no delinquency. Voluntary overtime essential, productive and being equitably shared.

HILEV Program not being afforded desired prompt, penetrative, aggressive and imaginative investigative and administrative attention. Administrative write-up prepared pointing out weaknesses in investigative and administrative handling of this program (copy attached). Legat Grove instructed to fully comply with Bureau instructions intensifying the development of high-level intelligence sources and contacts so vitally needed, thus enabling the Bureau to fulfill its obligations. Deficiencies detected in Legat Grove's handling of HILEV Program necessitate downgrading of administrative operations to Fair.

Personnel Matters - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerk-stenographers (same as last inspection). Legat requested one additional Agent and one additional clerk based on assigned case load, vastness of territory covered and additional responsibilities. Work load, road trips, and overall responsibilities closely analyzed by Inspector justifying only present complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerks - Legat agreed. Training procedures effective. No Agents overweight, unavailable or on limited duty. Morale appears high.

Contacts - Very Good (Last Inspection - Excellent). Effective sources and contacts exist at all levels of police and security organizations, insuring investigative responsibilities being properly handled. 45 new sources developed since previous inspection.

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Hong Kong

84 National Academy graduates occupy responsible positions throughout territory covered. Two additional candidates presently attending National Academy session. Sources and contacts so urgently required in connection with HILEV Program need further attention. Persons contacted by Inspector spoke highly of the Director, FBI and Hong Kong personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Daniel A. Grove, GS-16 at \$29,067, aged 41, veteran, not on probation, Legal Liaison Officer, Hong Kong, since 4/17/66. He makes an excellent personal appearance, is intelligent and has been most effective in establishing liaison contacts who can assist the FBI in handling normal investigative matters. He has an excellent command of the Chinese - Mandarin language. Since the previous inspection Legat Grove has failed to fully comply with Bureau instructions in aggressively obtaining intelligence data vitally needed under the HILEV Program (Administrative write-up attached). His failure to develop sources and contacts capable of producing high-level intelligence data as urgently needed, and his marginal administration of this important program warrant administrative action. Therefore, it is recommended that he be retained as Legat but censured and placed on probation. If approved, letter attached.

Letter not sent. Letter of charges sent in lieu of 9/2/71 En

Yes.

No ann. lv. scheduled 8/31

2. Joseph D. Maurice, GS-14 at \$23,591, aged 45, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legal Liaison Officer, Hong Kong, since 12/15/70. Maurice has an excellent personality and presents a most businesslike appearance. He is mature, intelligent and since being assigned to Hong Kong is gaining the necessary experience to handle assigned duties. He is considered qualified to continue in present assignment.

3. During the current inspection all pending investigative matters and the overall operation of Legat, Hong Kong, were subjected to penetrative and in-depth analysis. Investigative phases of Legat operations are being afforded aggressive attention; however, noticeable weaknesses detected in the developing of intelligence sources relating to HILEV Program. Hong Kong is the closest Legat operation to

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Hong Kong

Communist China and Hong Kong itself thrives with CHICOM activity. An extremely high potential exists for the development of intelligence data so vitally needed to fulfill our obligations concerning the internal security of the United States and our additional responsibility to the President. It is essential that our office in Hong Kong be retained since it has produced some high-level intelligence data of interest to us and, due to its strategic location, has the potential of obtaining highly sensitive information which would otherwise not be available.

✓

OK.
J

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PERMANENT BRIEF OF DANIEL A. GROVE ATTACHED.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
LA PAZ, BOLIVIA
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON
8/4 - 7/71

DATE: August 25, 1971

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Official: Nick F. Stames, Legal Attache (Legat), arrived La Paz 12/22/70, and opened office. First inspection.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good. Office temporarily located on third floor, U. S. Embassy, in downtown La Paz. To move to fourth floor about 10/1/71 and occupy two rooms with vault. Current space secure, well organized and attractively maintained. No security violations since office opened. Need for security stressed. No Bureau car - Legat authorized to utilize personally owned vehicle. No accidents. Minor housekeeping delinquencies detected, ordered corrected.

Investigative Operations - Very Good. Office covers Bolivia and Peru. Case load 7/31/71, 46, below average. Delinquency zero and case closings low. Increased case turnover encouraged. High percentage (69.6%) of cases generated by Legat. 72% of case load is of security nature. No substantive errors detected. One fugitive and 3 Selective Service Act delinquents located. No deportations effected. Recoveries total \$9,759.00. One applicant recruited. Criminal and intelligence source programs rated very good. Efforts being made for further expansion of high-level intelligence (HILEV) sources. 24 HILEV items submitted, of which 14 were disseminated to White House. Legat feels none of the accomplishments would have been achieved without FBI representative on scene.

Administrative Operations - Excellent. Chief Clerk's Office functioning smoothly and efficiently with no project work and low pending work. Form errors and misfiled index cards below averages. Clerk-stenographer has high production, no delinquency or retyped pages. Confidential fund in balance and properly maintained. Travel, contact and per diem expenses consistent with sound operations.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel File Nick F. Stames

ACL:bhg (6)

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
La Paz, Bolivia

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Personnel Matters - Excellent. Personnel complement of one Agent and one clerk-stenographer, adequate but not excessive. Agent proficient in necessary language. Overtime high but necessary and productive. Morale high.

Contacts - Excellent. Quality contacts developed in high executive and operational levels of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Legat encouraged to continue aggressive program for expanded coverage. All persons contacted by Inspector expressed admiration and high esteem for the Director, FBI and La Paz personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that this office be continued in view of the territory covered, the unrest and potential for strife affecting the U. S. and the production of HILEV intelligence material.

I concur.
[Signature]

[Signature]

2. Nick F. Stames, GS-15, at \$25,867, aged 36, nonveteran, not on probation, Legal Attache at La Paz since 12/22/70. Stames makes an excellent personal appearance; is conscientious, hard working, and an aggressive administrator. He is highly effective liaison representative and has excellent grasp of Bureau's overall operations. He previously served as ASAC in San Juan and is considered well qualified to continue in his present assignment or for a position of greater responsibility.

Just prior to the inspection Stames advised the Bureau of a threat against the life of a student attending college in the U. S. by airtel rather than cable, causing a delay in notifying authorities responsible for her protection. Stames is considered culpable and censure is recommended. (LETTER WILL HANDLE)

Attached for approval is a letter advising Legal Attache Stames of the inspection findings and censuring him for his dereliction in the above matter.

OK ✓
[Signature]

7 *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/AG
OF 10/26/00

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 23, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER *in*

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGAT)

LONDON, ENGLAND

INSPECTOR FLETCHER D. THOMPSON

7/29 - 8/4/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Officials: John T. Minnich, Legat since 10/6/65; Alden C. McCray, Assistant Legat since 11/22/58 and Number One Man since 11/4/66. Last inspection: 12/10 - 17/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office conveniently located American Embassy Building, second floor, downtown London. Marine Guards on duty after working hours and make periodic around-the-clock security checks. Cleaning handled by Embassy personnel in presence of Bureau personnel. Space attractive, well maintained and secure. No Bureau cars assigned.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office covers Great Britain and Ireland. Case load temporarily declined when new Copenhagen Office took over Scandinavian countries December, 1970. Since March, 1971, case load has been substantially higher than period 6 months earlier and on 7/31/71 was 341 (293 last inspection). Average cases per Agent consistently above other Legats during last 12 months. Delinquency above average most months while cases closed generally comparable other offices. 137 persons who were Bureau fugitives or Selective Service delinquents located (down from last inspection); 3 deportations effected. Legat of opinion majority of accomplishments would not have been realized without presence of Legat Office. Vital need for developing high-level intelligence (HILEV) information strongly emphasized by Inspector. Importance of program recognized by London personnel and 19 HILEV items submitted of which 11 disseminated to White House. Legat of opinion additional information of value can be developed if additional Agent assigned to office. Inspector agreed (handled separately). No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office staffed with experienced personnel and effectively administered. Chief Clerk's Office neat

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)

1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)

1 - Personnel Files John T. Minnich and Alden C. McCray

FDT:bhg (6)

OCT 5 1971

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CONTINUED -

ENCLOSURE

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
London, England

and efficiently operated; work is current. Stenographic production well above average. Continued close attention to all administrative operations stressed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Personnel complement of 2 Agents and 3 clerk-stenographers same as last inspection. Thorough analysis by Inspector of work load and potential for further development of HILEV sources indicates one additional Agent appears justified (handled separately); clerical complement adequate. Overtime high but essential, productive and equitably shared. No Agents unavailable, overweight or on limited duty. Morale appears high.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Aggressive and effective liaison program with wide range of foreign and U. S. Government agencies and individuals. Contacts are diversified and productive. All who were met by Inspector expressed highest regard for Director, FBI and London personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. John T. Minnich, GS-17 at \$34,716, aged 52, veteran, not on probation, Legat since 10/6/65. Makes excellent impression; is strong, experienced and dedicated Bureau representative and highly respected by persons with whom he does business. Fully qualified to continue as Legat. Available for promotion or transfer. Attached for approval is letter to Minnich advising him of inspection findings.

2. Alden C. McCray, GS-15 at \$27,483, aged 47, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 11/22/58 and Number One Man since 11/4/66. McCray is a dedicated, respected, hard-working Agent who is capably discharging his responsibilities and qualified to continue in present assignment and for further administrative advancement.

3. Heavy case load of investigative matters as well as important liaison and intelligence responsibilities in territory covered by London justifies continuance of Legat Office there. Recommendations regarding Legat's request for additional Agent will be submitted in overall memorandum of inspection results of Legal Attaches.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. K. PONDER

DATE: August 25, 1971

DECLASSIFIED BY *10/26/00*
ON *10/26/00*

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
MADRID, SPAIN
INSPECTOR PAUL J. MOHR
7/29 - 8/3/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Official: Vadja V. Kolombatovic, Legal Attache (Legat) since 7/28/69, when office reopened.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent).

Office on third floor of Embassy building, which is conveniently located. Space is efficiently organized, attractive and excellently maintained. Additional space, previously approved, being acquired in which to locate coding equipment. Strict attention afforded security of office and adherence to regulations.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office covers Spain, Gibraltar, Morocco and Portugal. Active case load 7/31/71 - 116 (last inspection 120). Case load above average for all Legat offices. Delinquency consistently below average; case closings above average. 25 Bureau subjects (11 fugitives and 14 Selective Service violators) located; one deportation effected; Legat instrumental in causing recovery in New York City of El Greco painting valued at over \$1 million and considered a Spanish National Treasure. 26 high-level intelligence (HILEV) items submitted to Bureau, of which 17 furnished to White House. Instructed to give major emphasis to HILEV Program. No substantive errors detected. Legat strongly expanding police sources to achieve maximum results.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Chief Clerk's Office efficiently organized and functioning smoothly. Form errors and misfiled index cards low. Pending and project work current. Stenographic production high; retypes low. Confidential fund closely controlled.

Personnel Matters - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Complement of one Agent and one clerk-stenographer adequate. Legat available, not overweight, on probation or limited duty. Overtime essential and productive. Morale excellent.

Enclosure *sent*

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
1 - Personnel File Vadja V. Kolombatovic

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Madrid, Spain

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Very Good). Legat has developed and expanded wide variety of sources at all levels in police and security agencies in Spain, Morocco and Portugal and extremely cooperative contacts in U. S. Government agencies. Legat currently contacting extremely valuable sources in HILEV Program; Robert C. Hill, Ambassador to Spain, extremely laudatory of Director and FBI. Ambassador expressed appreciation for presence of FBI and Legat's rapport with Embassy personnel. Other officials contacted expressed high esteem for Director, FBI and Madrid personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Vadja V. Kolombatovic, GS-15 at \$25,867, aged 47, veteran, not on probation. Legal Attache at Madrid since 7/28/69. Makes an excellent, mature appearance with engaging personality. Dedicated, hard working and has great deal of initiative. Especially well suited for position of Legat. Able administrator and has excellent knowledge of duties. Fluent in several foreign languages and is considered fully qualified to continue as Legat. Attached for approval is letter summarizing inspection findings. P
m

2. In view of excellent results achieved in 2 years since it was reopened, it is recommended that this Legat be continued. P
m

I concur.

7 - JHM

H

- 2 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. TOLSON ✓

DATE: August 11, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER *JWP*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALN/1/10*
ON *10/26/00*

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGAT)

(MANAGUA, NICARAGUA) *INSPECTION*

INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

7/24 - 28/71

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions *ph*

SUMMARY

Officials: James A. Miller, Legal Attache since 12/27/70; Armand A. Cammarota, Assistant Legal Attache and Number One Man since 1/9/71. First inspection since office opened December, 1970.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good. Office temporarily but conveniently located in two-story apartment building within U. S. Embassy grounds. Expect to move into main Embassy Building in future. Instructed to press for new space. Space adequate, efficiently organized and well maintained. Security stressed and suggestions for improvement made. No Bureau cars assigned and Agent personnel authorized to use personally owned. No accidents.

Investigative Operations - Fair. Office covers all of Central America. Case load 6/30/71, 68 (65 active). Case load and case closings low; no delinquency. Statistical accomplishments to 7/1/71 favorable - 20 fugitives and Selective Service delinquents located; 5 deportations effected; 10 stolen vehicles located, recovery value \$56,812.92. Contributions of high-level intelligence (HILEV) material disappointing (13 HILEV submissions, 4 used). One Security Index subject in territory; none visited area. Instructed to broaden criminal and security coverage and intensify efforts to obtain HILEV information. One substantive error detected for delayed investigation and Legal Attache subject of Administrative Memorandum for inadequate handling of liaison contacts. Percentage of substantive errors above average.

Administrative Operations - Fair. Chief Clerk's Office well organized and functioning efficiently. Form errors above field average and misfiled index cards below average. No project work and pending work below field average. Stenographic production and accuracy high, no retypes or delinquency. Recommendations made for strengthening administrative control of confidential fund. Overtime productive and equitably shared. Travel and per diem expenses being held to a minimum. Legat improperly recording sources and contacts with sources; material relating to two possible sources filed in office administration file; and suggested source not indexed or properly recorded.

Enclosures

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Unit) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files James A. Miller and Armand A. Cammarota

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Ponder

Classified by *6281 WOLF*
Exempt from GDS, Category *3*
Date of Declassification *Indefinite*

62-116375-547

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Managua, Nicaragua

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Personnel Matters - Very Good. Staff of two Agents and two clerk-stenographers adequate but not excessive. No Agents on limited duty, on probation, overweight or unavailable. Morale appears high.

Contacts - Very Good. Several quality contacts developed in high executive and operational levels of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in territory. Intensification ordered. Ambassador and others contacted by Inspector expressed admiration and esteem for Director, FBI and personnel in Managua.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Legat be continued in view of extent of territory (all of Central America); unrest, particularly in Guatemala; the Communist interest throughout territory, particularly in Guatemala and Costa Rica; internal strife between El Salvadore and Honduras; and potential unrest affecting internal security of the United States; statistical accomplishments (20 fugitives and Selective Service delinquents located, 5 deportations effected, 10 stolen vehicles recovered valued at \$56,812.92); and potential for additional accomplishments. Office in existence seven months and potential not yet developed.

JKA

2. James A. Miller, GS-15 at \$25,059, aged 46, veteran, not on probation, Legal Attache at Managua since 12/27/70. He makes an excellent, mature appearance and seems interested and enthusiastic. He was involved in a substantive error write-up and an administrative write-up (copies attached). Error related to excessive delay (12/14/70 to 6/7/71) in verifying address in Nicaragua of Selective Service subject. Miller explained the delay was due to opening of new office and case not received at Managua until 3/2/71; that he initiated action 3/3/71 but made no record of it. ^{serials}Explanation unacceptable. Miller was assigned case in Mexico City, 12/14/70, and sent to Managua by Mexico City 1/21/71. Records at Mexico City reflect serials received Managua 1/25/71. File shows no action taken by Miller until 5/4/71. Subject's address in Managua verified 6/7/71.

The administrative write-up dealt with lack of sources (Miller had 27 of the 103 in office records); contacts with sources not recorded; contacts with sources

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Managua, Nicaragua

indicated on #3 (locator) card as relating to office administration; failure to contact possible source in Panama suggested by New Orleans; and failure to index, properly record or pursue another possible source, an American Businessman in Panama. Material relating to latter sources improperly placed in file on office administration.

Miller explained he has other sources but maintains no record of them in the Legat; he utilized the office administration file number to sign out on when making contacts; he made no entries for contacts after hours; and information concerning possible sources was mistakenly directed to office administration file.

This is Miller's first assignment as Legat -- his previous duties related primarily to a road trip out of Mexico City. He needs additional time to develop ability to administer and direct Legat operations. In view of the deficiencies detected, recommend Miller be censured and placed on probation. Letter attached for approval will summarize inspection results and advise him of censure and probation.

3. Armand A. Cammarota, GS-14 at \$26,367, aged 54, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 1/9/71. Cammarota makes an excellent, mature appearance; has leadership qualities; is dedicated, experienced and knowledgeable employee, with sincere, businesslike and enthusiastic attitude. Legat considers him qualified for additional responsibilities and recommends him for immediate advancement. Inspector concurs that he is qualified for position of greater responsibility.

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT/crt 8-11-71

Recommend recheck inspection at the end of 120 days.

DISCUSSED WITH MR. FELT 11-3-71. HE SAID
RECHECK NOT NECESSARY SINCE LEGAT
MILLER WAS
LATER REMOVED.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. K. PONDER *JKP*

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
(MEXICO CITY, ~~MEXICO CITY~~)
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON
7/12 - 23/71

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2ALM/106*
ON *10/26/00*
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DATE: August 9, 1971
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
SUMMARY Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: Robert T. Nischwitz, Legal Attache since 4/27/70; John J. Foarde, Jr., Assistant Legal Attache and Number One Man since 4/20/66. Last inspection: 6/27 - 7/15/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office conveniently located fourth floor U. S. Embassy in downtown Mexico City. Office space for headquarters and two Resident Agencies secure, well organized and neatly maintained. No security violations since last inspection and no security weaknesses noted. Minor housekeeping delinquencies ordered corrected. Four automobiles inspected -- no safety defects. Two new cars on order, one to be sold. Fleet of five automobiles is adequate, fully utilized and securely maintained. Automobile operating and repair costs reduced, but remain above field averages - economy stressed. No accidents since last inspection.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Mexico City is only operational foreign office and encompasses all of Mexico. Case load -- 627 (603 active); up from last inspection when office also covered Central America - 616 (553 active). Average delinquency since last inspection below other Legal Attache Offices (Legats) and field. Case load and case closings per Agent below other Legats -- instructions given to improve. Statistical accomplishments down past 12 months compared with previous twelve months' period in Selective Service Act delinquents and fugitives located, deportations and total monetary recoveries; but up in automobiles recovered and their value. This decline due in part to loss of Central America in December, 1970, when Managua Legat opened. Improvement ordered. Extensive and productive security informant network covers all areas of Bureau interest; however, there has been decline numerical strength. Instructions given to broaden coverage and exploit logical contacts to develop high-level intelligence information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Unit) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files Robert T. Nischwitz and John J. Foarde, Jr.

ACL:bhg (6)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

Classified by *6283*
Exempt from GDS, Category *1*
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Inspection - Office of Legal Attache

Criminal informant strength improved since last inspection - further improvement ordered. Substantial contributions made by office in securing high-level intelligence of interest to Bureau and White House. Particularly significant information developed regarding recent student demonstrations in Mexico, Soviet and North Korean training of Mexican guerillas and matters involving Mexico - Cuba relations. This phase of operation emphasized by Inspector. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Supervision equitably shared between Legat and Assistant Legat. Chief Clerk's Office well organized and functioning efficiently. Pending work and project work above average - attributable to new Bureau-authorized file destruction program. Intensification of destruction ordered. Form errors below average. Misfiled index cards average for offices of similar size and below overall field average. Stenographic production above field average; no retypes or delinquencies. Travel and communications expenses reduced; slight increase in per diem costs -- justified. Confidential Fund closely controlled. Recommendation made for strengthening accounting procedures with respect to informant payments. Overtime essential, productive and equitably shared. Trend memoranda prepared calling for better protection of informant identity in communications and destruction of informant memoranda no longer needed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Personnel complement 7/12/71, 23 (11 Agents, including Legat and Assistant Legat; 12 clerks). Inspector considers clerical complement excessive by one stenographer; Legat agrees. Reduction ordered by attrition. Agent complement reduced by one since last inspection due to opening new Legat in Managua, Nicaragua. Territory covered by Mexico City reduced correspondingly. Agent complement adequate, but not excessive. No Agents on limited duty, probation, overweight or unavailable. No training weaknesses noted. Personnel represent U. S. Government in efficient and effective manner. Morale appears very high.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). The two FBI National Academy (NA) graduates who occupied positions of importance in agencies within Legat territory were replaced with administration change in Mexico in December, 1970. Mexican authorities encouraged to nominate qualified police officers for NA to upgrade law enforcement. Excellent network of contacts maintained on operational and executive levels of Mexican Government and police agencies. Contacts among U. S. agencies indicate effective relationships. All officials contacted by Inspector hold Director, FBI and Legat personnel in extremely high esteem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Robert T. Nischwitz, GS-16 at \$29,067, aged 47, veteran, not on probation, Legal Attache at Mexico City since 4/27/70, second office as Legat. Nischwitz makes an excellent, mature appearance. He possesses effective leadership qualities; is a

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache

dedicated, knowledgeable administrator, and exhibits a sincere, businesslike and enthusiastic attitude in current assignment. Completely qualified to continue as Legal Attache. Attached for approval is letter summarizing inspection findings.

JHP

2. John J. Foarde, Jr., GS-15 at \$26,675, aged 47, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legal Attache and Number One Man at Mexico City since 4/20/66. Unavailable during inspection due to serious illness (hepatitis). Legat advised he makes a mature, businesslike appearance and has pleasant personality. Considered conscientious, hard working, and a capable administrator. Legat rates him excellent, noting he has served in current assignment five years, demonstrating effective leadership and ability. Results of inspection tend to substantiate these comments. Recommend Foarde continue in his present position.

JHP

3. Recommendations concerning other personnel handled separately.

✓ JHP

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/LTK
ON 10/26/00

DATE: August 24, 1971

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TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
OTTAWA, CANADA

INSPECTOR THOMAS W. LEAVITT NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
8/3 - 6/71

SUMMARY Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: Moss Lee Innes, Legal Attache (Legat) since 4/19/59; Joseph A. Marion, Jr., Assistant Legat since 4/20/70. Last inspection: 11/23 - 27/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office located on 4th floor, U. S. Embassy Building, in downtown Ottawa. Space crowded but secure and well maintained. No security violations. Legat instructed to follow closely installation of auxiliary power supply which has been ordered.

Investigative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Legat, Ottawa, nonoperational. Case load as of 7/31/71 594 (570 active); last inspection 599 (590 active). Active case load averaged 600 per month since last inspection; up from average of 572 for comparable period prior to previous inspection. Delinquency high - basically due to number of priority matters handled by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Instructed to follow proper posting procedures to assist in reducing delinquency. Slight increase in cases closed per month (314) over last inspection (298). Statistical accomplishments up in fugitives located; automobile and monetary recoveries down. Increase in deportations. Selective Service delinquent locates up considerably (654) since last inspection (499). No significant change in Communist Party (CP) membership; however, CP of Canada is supporting U. S.-based revolutionary group, the "Black Revolutionary Party." 43 Security Index subjects residing in Canada - an increase of 7 in a year. Activity of New Left and Black Power advocates continues unabated. Instructed to aggressively pursue matter of New Left fugitives with RCMP. Chinese Communist (Chicom) Embassy established with potential for intelligence activity. Increase in number U. S. residents visiting Chicom Embassy. Legat instructed to closely follow and keep Bureau advised. 21 high-level intelligence (HILEV) items submitted, of which 9 furnished to White House. Instructed to place special emphasis on HILEV program. No substantive errors detected.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files Moss Lee Innes and Joseph A. Marion, Jr.

TWL:bhg (6)

ENCLOSURE

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Ottawa, Canada

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Administrative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Form errors above field average. Weaknesses ordered corrected. Misfiled index cards below field average. Suggestions made regarding preparation and destruction of index cards to alleviate space problem. Trend detected in failure of clerical personnel to initial incoming and outgoing mail - ordered corrected. Communications, travel, per diem and contact costs down. Economy stressed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Personnel complement 2 Agents, 4 clerk-stenographers - increase of one clerk-stenographer since last inspection. Staff adequate, but not excessive. Morale high, overtime productive.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Relationship with RCMP excellent. Quality liaison contacts maintained on all levels. All officials contacted expressed high regard for FBI and Legat personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommended that Legat Office, Ottawa, be retained. The relationship between U. S. and Canada brought about by common border, similar domestic problems and constant travel between countries of dangerous New Left and black extremists requires daily contact with liaison sources regarding these problems. Potential for Chinese communist intelligence activity directed against U. S. from Canada is also paramount. Existence of Legat, Ottawa, is also beneficial in location of various types of fugitives of interest to us as well as monetary recoveries.

2. Moss Lee Innes, aged 50, GS-16 at \$31,881, veteran, not on probation, at Ottawa since 4/19/59. Presents impressive personal appearance, is mature and extremely able liaison representative. Qualified to continue as Legat. Attached for approval is letter summarizing inspection findings.

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Ottawa, Canada

3. Joseph A. Marion, Jr., aged 44, GS-15 at \$24,251, veteran, not on probation, at Ottawa since 4/20/70. Marion is mature, businesslike individual who is functioning effectively in current capacity. Qualified to continue as Assistant Legat.

V. 7 *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2ALM/STK*
ON *1026/00*

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 25, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
PARIS, FRANCE
INSPECTOR FLETCHER D. THOMPSON
8/5 - 11/71

PARIS INSPECTION

SUMMARY

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: Norman W. Philcox, Legal Attache (Legat) since 7/8/60. Mike G. Zinck Assistant Legat since 12/22/70 and Number One Man since 8/20/71. Last inspection: 12/2 - 9/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office conveniently located downtown Paris on 6th floor of American Embassy Annex. May be moved at request of Embassy to 4th floor. Legat has taken initiative to insure suitable space obtained if move materializes. Space tentatively committed will afford comparable or improved security, larger vault and additional needed working space. Legat instructed to follow closely. Marine Guards on duty in building lobby after working hours and periodic security checks made of our space. Office is well maintained and secure. No Bureau cars assigned.

Investigative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Liberia and Sierra Leone covered by Paris Office. Third Agent assigned December, 1970, for primary purpose of affording greater attention to high-level intelligence (HILEV) matters. Active case load 7/31/71 - 209, down slightly from last inspection, but case load and closings have been up substantially past 6 months; delinquency below average each of last 12 months. 76 Security Index subjects known to have visited countries covered by Paris since last inspection; 45 security subjects not on Security Index known to reside in territory. Legat kept advised of activity these persons through American and foreign sources. Accomplishments during past year include 27 fugitives and/or Selective Service delinquents located, and recovery of \$7,000,000 in securities stolen in United States. Legat of opinion majority of these accomplishments possible only because Legat present and could not have been achieved through normal diplomatic channels. Legat has cordial and productive liaison with police and security forces in territory. Necessity for caution by all personnel in dealing with foreign nationals stressed by Inspector

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files Norman W. Philcox and Mike G. Zinck

ENCLOSURE

SECRET CONTINUED - OVER

FDT:bhg (6)

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Paris, France

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since they are charged with responsibility for gathering positive intelligence information even from friendly nations, and our employees on foreign assignment could be possible targets. Noting probability Chinese communists will be admitted to United Nations and, therefore, have Mission in New York in near future, Legat instructed to be especially alert for information of value concerning modus operandi of Chinese Communist Intelligence Service (CHICOM) from experience of French security forces since diplomatic relations have existed between France and CHICOMS for extended period. Considerable support in France of Eldridge Cleaver faction of Black Panther Party; effective coverage through French criminal and security services. Favorable results achieved in recent months in acquiring HILEV data of interest to President - 38 HILEV items submitted; 21 disseminated to White House (10 to White House in June - July). High priority this important program strongly emphasized by Inspector to all personnel. Legat recognizes importance and has positive plans for expansion of sources. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Legat and clerical staff are well experienced in foreign operations and office is effectively administered. Inspector suggested in interest of closer supervision and fixing of responsibility that Legat prepare written instructions setting forth guidelines for division of work between him and the two assistants. Legat agreed and this has been done. Minor corrections ordered in Defense Plans. Chief Clerk's Office operating efficiently; work current and form errors below average. Stenographic production high with retypes low. Continued close attention to all administrative operations stressed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Personnel complement of 3 Agents and 3 clerk-stenographers considered optimum number for handling liaison and other responsibilities. Overtime essential, productive and equitably shared. No Agents unavailable, overweight or on limited duty. Staff working as team and morale appears high.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Effective liaison maintained with diversified and productive contacts, both American and foreign. All met by Inspector were cordial and expressed high regard for and confidence in Director, FBI, and Paris personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Norman W. Philcox, GS-17 at \$36,000, aged 56, nonveteran, not on probation, Legat since 6/18/59. Experienced, businesslike, highly respected by

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Paris, France

persons with whom he does business, effective Bureau representative and able administrator; fully qualified to continue as Legat. Attached for approval is letter to Philcox advising him of inspection findings.

Pm

2. Mike G. Zinck, GS-14 at \$22,897, aged 41, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 12/22/70 and Number One Man since 8/20/71. Zinck makes excellent initial impression, is personable, experienced in foreign operations, hard worker and qualified to continue as Assistant Legat.

Pm

3. The case load of investigative matters, as well as the important liaison and intelligence responsibilities in the countries covered by Paris, justifies continuance of our Legal Attache Office there. It is recommended, therefore, that the office of Legal Attache in Paris be continued with the present complement of 3 Agents and 3 clerk-stenographers.

✓ 7 *PH* *Pm*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 31, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 ALM/715

ON 10/26/00

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE

ROME, ITALY

INSPECTOR PAUL J. MOHR

8/3 - 9/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Officials: Thomas J. Biamonte, Legal Attache (Legat) since 11/7/67. Joseph C. Michela, Assistant Legal Attache since 12/14/70. Last inspection: 4/6 - 13/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office is convenient to police and agency contacts from its location on the second floor of the American Embassy Building. No Bureau automobiles assigned. Space is efficiently organized and excellently maintained. Security regulations strictly adhered to.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office covers Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Turkey and Cyprus added to Rome territory during expansion of Legats in December, 1970. Active case load 7/31/71 was 169 (147 last inspection). Average cases assigned per Agent below that of other Legats during past six months. Cases closed slightly below average. Consistently low delinquency. 14 Selective Service delinquents and fugitives located; 1 deportation effected; and no recoveries. No substantive errors detected.

Since January, 1971, Rome has submitted ten high-level intelligence (HILEV) items for possible dissemination to the White House - seven used. Rome below average in submissions compared to other Legats, but higher percentage of items submitted have been disseminated. Legat and Assistant Legat instructed to intensify efforts to exceed HILEV performance this area. Inspector instructed that high-level contacts be developed and, starting immediately, Legats are to increase frequency and duration of road trips to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to implement objectives of HILEV Program.

Administrative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Chief Clerk's Office functioning efficiently and well organized. Form errors low, no

Enclosure *see 2-1-71*

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files Thomas J. Biamonte and Joseph C. Michela

PJM:bhg(6)

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Rome

misfiled index cards detected. Pending and project work current. Stenographic retypes low, production high. Confidential expenditures tightly controlled. Trend of improper handling of references and indexing names appearing in substantive files noted.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Two Agents and two clerk-stenographers assigned - adequate. Rome Office reduced one man 4/21/70 as result of analysis of work load during last inspection. Assistant Legat Michela assigned to Rome Office during expansion of Legats in December, 1970. Continued assignment of Assistant Legat considered contingent upon ability to produce results in HILEV Program. Legat instructed to make appropriate recommendations regarding reduction of personnel if additional production not realized. Legat instructed to follow closely. No Agents on limited duty, probation, overweight, or unavailable. Overtime productive, essential, and equitably shared. Morale appears high.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Rome Office since last inspection expanded contacts and has effective sources in a broad area of foreign and U. S. Government agencies, as well as sources outside of official agencies. Recently developed sources should result in more effective HILEV Program. Officials contacted by Inspector complimentary concerning the Director, FBI and Rome Office personnel. Ambassador Graham Martin expressed high regard for Director and stated he relies heavily on FBI personnel in Rome and appreciates their efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Thomas J. Biamonte, GS-16 at \$29,067.00, aged 44, veteran, not on probation, fully available, Legal Attache, Rome since 11/7/67. Makes excellent appearance, mature, engaging personality, well suited for liaison work in Italy. Is hard working, enthusiastic and fully qualified to continue in present assignment as Legat. Letter summarizing inspection findings is attached for approval. 

2. Joseph C. Michela, GS-15 at \$26,675.00, aged 46, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 12/14/70. Michela on annual leave during

- 2 -

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Rome

~~SECRET~~

inspection. Inspector interviewed Michela just prior to departure. Michela previously Legat in Rome and should be continued in current assignment.

3. In view of the case load and the political and economic importance of the countries covered by Rome and the potential to produce a large volume of high-level intelligence, it is recommended that the Rome Office be continued with its present complement.

OK.
H

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- 3 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: September 8, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER *JKW*

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 *PLH*
ON 10/26/00

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE

TEL AVIV, ISRAEL

INSPECTOR PAUL J. MOHR

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

8/16 - 20/71

Tel Aviv - Inspection Unauthorized Disclosure

SUMMARY

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: Theodore N. Goble, Legal Attache (Legat) since 12/20/70; Harold Rubenstein, Assistant Legat since 12/20/70. First inspection since office opened 12/20/70 as result of expansion of foreign offices.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Fair. Office located in American Embassy Building convenient to downtown Tel Aviv. Temporary space well maintained and secure. Strict security measures in effect. (Subsequent to inspection, security breach by clerk-stenographer noted in a mailing procedure and called to Bureau's attention - handled separately. On this basis Legat being downgraded to Fair. Would otherwise have been Excellent.) Will occupy excellent permanent office space in near future. No Bureau cars assigned.

Investigative Operations - Excellent. Office covers only Israel. Case load 7/31/71 - 68, below average, but increasing steadily since office opened. Legat of opinion will continue as coverage expanded. Delinquency low. 8 Selective Service delinquents and Bureau fugitives located; 3 deportations effected; no recoveries. Highly successful in high-level intelligence (HILEV) results. Since January, 1971, 43 items submitted - 28 furnished to White House. Expansion of present coverage stressed. Legat of opinion additional high-level information can be obtained and will make efforts to expand coverage. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Very Good. Experienced personnel assigned and office effectively administered. Chief Clerk's Office neat and operated satisfactorily. Work is current and stenographic production above average. Continued close attention to all administrative operations stressed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good. Two Agents and two clerk-stenographers assigned. Analysis of work load and the potential for further development of high-level contacts

Enclosure *sent 9-8-71*

1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)

1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)

1 - Personnel Files Theodore N. Goble and Harold Rubenstein

PJM:bhg (6)

NW 55127 DocId:32989631 Page 87

ENCLOSURE CONTINUED OVER

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Classified by *10/26/00*
Exempt from GDS, Category *3*
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Tel Aviv

justify continuing present Agent and clerical complement. Overtime essential, productive and equitably shared. No Agents unavailable, overweight or on limited duty. Morale high.

Contacts - Excellent. Legat and Assistant Legat successful in gaining confidence of high Israeli government officials. Wide range of contacts, all productive, and diversified. All who were met by Inspector expressed high regard for the Director, FBI and Tel Aviv personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Theodore N. Goble, GS-15 at \$25,059, aged 46, veteran, not on probation, Legat since 12/20/70. Is dedicated, hard working and enthusiastic. Makes excellent impression; effective in personal contacts, and is highly respected. Has good command of Hebrew language and is considered qualified to continue as Legat. He is available for promotion or transfer. Attached for approval is letter to Goble advising him of inspection findings.

JAD

2. Harold Rubenstein, GS-14 at \$22,897, aged 49, veteran, not on probation, Assistant Legat since 12/20/70. Dedicated, hard-working Agent who makes an excellent impression and is very effective in his contacts. Fully capable and qualified to continue in present assignment. Fluent in Hebrew, Spanish and French. Is available for promotion or transfer.

JAD

3. In view of highly successful results in obtaining items of high-level nature which have been disseminated to White House, it is recommended this office be continued.

OK.

Note Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Tel Aviv, denied use of cable facilities to Legat 8/20/71 and insisted on privilege of reviewing our material

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Tel Aviv

before authorizing transmission of same. We protested DCM actions to Secretary of State and advised Dr. Kissinger at the White House. By letter 9/2/71 Mr. Rogers advised that he had suspended above requirement placed on Legat by DCM. Attached letter instructs Legat to keep Bureau advised of all subsequent developments.

AM *L* *PER* *7* *HAD*

- 3 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 24, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/1715
ON 10/26/00

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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE

TOKYO, JAPAN

INSPECTOR MASON G. WORKING

7/31 - 8/6/71

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUMMARY

Officials: Harold L. Child, Jr., Legal Attache (Legat) 11/14/54 to 12/4/67 and since 6/26/69. Roderick V. Precht, Jr., Assistant Legat 6/12/66 to 11/7/67; Legat 11/7/67 to 5/28/69. Assistant Legat since 5/28/69. Last inspection: 11/14 - 22/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office located second floor, American Embassy Annex, fireproof reinforced concrete building, downtown Tokyo. Space adequate and, although old, is neat and businesslike in appearance. Contracts being obtained to refurbish which will modernize appearance. Security of space and documents stressed. No security violations. No Bureau automobiles assigned.

Investigative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Very Good). Office covers Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and South Korea. Active cases 307; steady growth in case load past year. Cases per Agent exceed other Legats and delinquency below Legat averages every month since last inspection. No substantive errors detected in 373 files reviewed. Cases being closely followed by Legat through established contacts and sources. 70% of case load security; 4% criminal; 26% applicant and other. Japan Communist Party (JCP), with estimated membership 250,000, has achieved increasing power in Japanese political positions -- considered major threat to internal security of Japan. Soviets continue to be major financial contributor to JCP. FUNDS contributed to aid in June, 1971, elections. Communist front organizations active, following doctrines of JCP, Communist China and USSR. Strength of radical New Left group increasing; anticipate violent protest against policies of Japanese Government and U. S. involvement in Vietnam war. Black extremist activities confined primarily to promoting unrest among black service-men; no organized black extremist groups. Coverage of Security Index subjects and subjects of security cases very effective. Six Bureau fugitives and nine Selective

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
1 - Personnel Files Harold L. Child, Jr. and Roderick V. Precht, Jr.

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Tokyo, Japan

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Service delinquents located in 9-month period since last inspection (comparable to 1 and 14 in one-year period, last inspection). No recoveries this inspection or last. Since inception High Level Intelligence (HILEV) Program in September, 1970, 43 HILEV items submitted; 20 disseminated to White House. Legat affording aggressive and imaginative attention to HILEV Program. High-level sources and contacts furnishing valuable intelligence data -- instructed to develop additional sources and contacts of this caliber. Legat extremely knowledgeable of political, social, economic, and intelligence situation in territory covered.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Chief Clerk's Office well organized and operating efficiently. Form errors and misfiled index cards well below field averages. Stenographic accuracy and production very high - no delinquency. Agent and clerical personnel operating at peak performance to handle intensified intelligence program.

Personnel Matters - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerk-stenographers, same as last inspection. Present complement adequate, not excessive - Legat agrees. Agent and clerical overtime exceptionally high, but essential, productive and equitably shared. Clerical employees refuse to request compensatory leave or overtime pay although overtime necessary and essential to fulfill assigned duties. Training procedures effective. No Agents overweight, unavailable or on limited duty. Morale outstanding.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Quality high-level contacts maintained in strategic branches of police and security agencies in all countries covered. Program very effective. 71 contacts developed since last inspection. 9 National Academy (NA) graduates occupy responsible positions; 3 additional candidates in current NA session. All persons contacted during inspection spoke highly of Director, FBI and Tokyo personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Harold L. Child, Jr., GS-17 at \$36,000, aged 51, nonveteran, not on probation. Legat Tokyo 11/14/54 to 12/4/67 and since 6/26/69. Makes excellent personal appearance and has excellent personality. Conscientious, aggressive, highly intelligent and capable administrator. Excellent command of Japanese language. Extremely well qualified to continue in present assignment or for further advancement. If approved, attached letter will advise him of inspection findings.

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Tokyo, Japan

2. Roderick V. Precht, Jr., GS-15 at \$26,675, aged 45, veteran, not on probation. Assistant Legat, Tokyo, 6/12/66 to 11/7/67; Legat 11/7/67 to 5/28/69; and Assistant Legat since 5/28/69. Makes excellent personal appearance. Has mature, intelligent, and businesslike approach to all assignments and responsibilities. He is most personable, very enthusiastic, and loyal. Has capably demonstrated ability to handle Legat position in past and well qualified for administrative advancement. Retention in present position justified.

3. During current inspection all pending investigative matters and overall operation of Legat, Tokyo, subjected to penetrative and in-depth analysis. All phases of Legat operation being afforded vigorous attention with particular emphasis on obtaining HILEV data. Presence of Legat has resulted in obtaining HILEV data disseminated to President and other Government agencies, which information would not be available without Bureau representative on scene. To fulfill our obligations concerning internal security of U. S. and particularly to the President, it is essential that Legat, Tokyo, be retained.

G.R.
H

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PM
PM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/216

ON 10/26/00

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: September 14, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: FOREIGN OPERATIONS - LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES (LEGAT)

PURPOSE: To summarize views of Bureau officials and set forth recommendations of Inspection Division relative to retention of 17 existing Legats, recommend opening of 6 more, and reopen Resident Agency in Mexico.

BACKGROUND: Prior to December, 1970, we operated 11 Legat Offices (Bern, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Ottawa, Paris, Rome and Tokyo). In September, 1970, the President in conversation with the Director requested that we expand our foreign operations because of the President's desire for better intelligence. The President also discussed this with the Secretary of State who advised that he thought it was a good idea. As a result, 6 additional offices were opened in the latter part of December, 1970 (Beirut, Caracas, Copenhagen, La Paz, Managua and Tel Aviv). These were opened based on the opinion of the President and Dr. Kissinger that our Legats were furnishing highly valuable information of interest to the White House.

On the basis of our productivity in obtaining high-level information, the President again requested (May, 1971) the Director to consider further foreign office expansion. In response to this, at Director's request Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) recommended reopening our offices in Manila, Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo and opening new offices at Canberra, Kuala Lumpur and New Delhi. DID also recommended adding one Agent to each of 5 existing offices - Beirut, Caracas, London, Madrid and Tokyo.

Mr. Sullivan had approved of the 6 additional Legats opened in December, 1970, and, in fact, personally initiated the recommendation of one of them (Beirut). He had not previously expressed opposition to the expansion of our foreign liaison operations, but in a memorandum 6/7/71 Mr. Sullivan expressed the strong opinion that the proposed addition of Agent personnel abroad and reopening or opening of new offices should not be accomplished as he felt that many of our Legats were not furnishing information and services sufficiently valuable to justify their retention. In his memorandum 6/16/71 Mr. Sullivan recommended our offices at Bern, Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, Madrid and Tokyo should be closed. With regard to Beirut, Caracas, Copenhagen, La Paz, Managua and Tel Aviv (opened December, 1970, with his approval) Mr. Sullivan said he seriously doubted the value of these offices and recommended they

1. Messrs. Felt, Sullivan, Mohr, Callahan, Miller
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ENCLOSURE
JKP:wmi (7)

Unauthorized Disclosure CONTINUED - OVER
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by 62-11632-547
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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NAT. INT. SEC.

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Foreign Operations - Legats

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be permitted to operate for 6 months and then analyzed thoroughly to determine if they were worth the money being spent; if not, all of them should be closed. He completely opposed further expansion and opening offices in Manila, Rio de Janeiro, Santo Domingo, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur and New Delhi.

INSPECTION DIVISION EVALUATION:

Based on the divergence of opinion the Director ordered immediate inspections of all existing Legats. These inspections have been completed and separate memoranda have gone forward justifying the retention of all 17 existing offices. Retention has been based primarily on our success in obtaining high-level items of interest to the White House. As of 8/31/71, 521 items had been submitted to the Bureau by these offices, of which 295 had been disseminated to the White House. Numerous favorable comments have been received from the White House. In each instance the Director concurred with recommendations that the 17 existing offices be continued.

It had been suggested by the DID that our coverage could be stepped up by increasing our complement in Beirut, Caracas, London, Madrid and Tokyo. As a result of our inspection an additional Agent was recommended for London and this was approved. It is also felt that the Resident Agency formerly at Hermosillo, Mexico, should be reopened to cover a vast region now handled as a road trip. This should be staffed by personnel already assigned to our Mexico City Office. Addition of personnel to other Legat Offices is not recommended.

As indicated, it was recommended that offices be opened in Canberra, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, New Delhi, Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo. Based on the desires of the White House for additional high-level intelligence and our past successes in this area, it is felt that we should advise the President that we are ready to go forward with this expansion, if that is still his desire, at any time he wishes. Reopening Manila would relieve Hong Kong of a long road trip and provide closer attention to mounting political developments in China. Reopening Rio de Janeiro would relieve Buenos Aires of a 25,000 mile road trip and provide on-the-spot coverage in this important area (Brazil) which is larger than the United States. Reopening Santo Domingo would relieve San Juan Office of road trip and furnish prompt coverage not only of Dominican Republic but of current political developments in Haiti. Canberra would cover Australia and New Zealand, relieving Hong Kong of the road trip. Kuala Lumpur would cover Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and initiate coverage in Indonesia, would relieve Hong Kong of road trip and provide more rapid coverage of area currently politically important. New Delhi would

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Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Foreign Operations - Legats

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cover India, East and West Pakistan and Nepal, an area where we previously had no coverage, but where potential for political intelligence is high.

QUOTA OF FBI EMPLOYEES ON FOREIGN ASSIGNMENT:

Our quota of personnel on foreign assignment authorized by State Department is 88. When it was approved that we add 1 Agent to London, it was decided to move an Agent from Buenos Aires to London to stay within our quota. Subsequently, James A. Miller was removed as Legat at Managua, and it was recommended and approved that Managua operate with only 1 man until the full potential of that office could be determined. Thus we presently have 87 employees on foreign assignment, 1 under our quota. As we may have to replace Agent in Buenos Aires or Managua, we should not reduce our quota.

In its recommendation of 5/28/71 for expansion of Legat operations, DID recommended staffing the 6 proposed offices as follows:

	<u>Agents</u>	<u>Clerks</u>	<u>Total</u>
Manila	1	1	2
Rio de Janeiro	2	2	4
Santo Domingo	1	1	2
Canberra	2	2	4
Kuala Lumpur	2	2	4
New Delhi	2	2	4
Total	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>20</u>

While this staffing appears to be reasonable, in view of the present concern for economy and the balance of payments problem, it would appear preferable to start each of these offices with only one Agent and one clerk. Thus, we would be increasing the number of Bureau employees on foreign assignment by 12 rather than 20, and doing not that which is desirable but that which is essential.

The opening of the proposed 6 offices with one Agent and one clerk each would increase our present quota of personnel on foreign assignment from 88 to 100. This would be presented to State Department for its approval after discussion with the President and/or Dr. Kissinger.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we retain our 17 existing Legal Attache Offices.

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Foreign Operations - Legats

~~SECRET~~

2. That we reopen the Resident Agency at Hermosillo, Mexico, to cover an area presently being handled on road trip basis out of Monterrey, Mexico. No additional personnel required. If approved, Administrative Division to handle.

*Letter to Thomas Stern
-cc- 9/17/71, TJF:och*

Teletype to Mexico, 9/17/71, LDH:ndd

*Yes.
Vd*

JWP

3. That the Director may wish to consider advising the President through Dr. Kissinger that in response to the President's request in May, we recommend expansion of foreign operations by reopening Manila, Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo; and opening Canberra, Kuala Lumpur and New Delhi. Also, that we are ready to do this whenever he so directs and arrangements can be perfected with the State Department.

*I shall discuss
matter with
Dr. K. H*

JWP

4. That upon receipt of White House approval of this proposal, the State Department be requested to authorize an increase in FBI personnel on foreign assignment from the present 88 to 100 and that other necessary arrangements be handled with State Department to open the new offices.

after Dr. K. has considered it.

H. JWP

JWP

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UNEXCISED - FILE COPY

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10/26/00 *SP 2 ALM 1206*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON *P*

DATE: September 7, 1971

FROM : J. K. PONDER *JKP*

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
BONN, GERMANY
INSPECTOR FLETCHER D. THOMPSON
8/17 - 22/71

~~SECRET~~ 22 4
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 MCM/716
ON 10/26/00

Tolson _____
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Callahan _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
SUMMARY Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: George A. Van Noy, Legal Attache (Legat) since 9/19/55. Floyd R. Peters, Assistant Legat since 6/28/70 and Number One Man since 2/19/71. (John C. F. Morris, Assistant Legat 12/29/62 - 7/31/71). Last inspection: 4/20 - 27/70.

Physical Condition and Maintenance - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Space on sixth floor of American Embassy Building in suburb of Bonn. Office is secure with Marine Guards on duty in building lobby after working hours and periodic security checks made of our space. Office is neat, well arranged and maintained, but extremely crowded. Legat instructed to pursue negotiations with Embassy officials for additional space, contiguous to existing space if possible, but office may have to move to another floor in same building. Legat to furnish estimates and recommendations to Bureau before making any commitments. No Bureau cars assigned.

Investigative Operations - Very Good (Last Inspection - Excellent). West Germany, the Netherlands and Austria (since 12/70) covered by Bonn Office. Active case load (majority of security nature) 328 as of 7/31/71 (248 last inspection). Over 12-month period case load and cases closed per Agent well above average each month; delinquency below average each month. Communications Intercept Service (CIS), which makes available information concerning mail sent from United States to persons in East Germany, continues to produce valuable material, including information on Left Wing organizations in U. S. and travel of Security Index subjects and communists to Eastern Bloc. Increasing volume of material (over 5600 items since last inspection) has burdened both Agent and clerical personnel. (Material is provided in raw form and must be translated -- if in German -- analyzed, searched and transmitted to Bureau.) Since April, 1971, necessary to transmit some items to Bureau in bulk without benefit of thorough analysis in Bonn Office. Inspector

Enclosure *Aug 9-8-71 62-116395-547*
1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
1 - Personnel Files George A. Van Noy and Floyd R. Peters

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Bonn

determined experienced clerical employee (Miss Cuddy) capable of reviewing and processing much of this material. Assignment of this clerk-stenographer full time to project would release Agent personnel to handle other important responsibilities, primarily in the field of gathering high-level intelligence (HILEV). Since last inspection 78 Security Index subjects known to have visited or resided in Bonn territory; 76 other security subjects known to be residing these countries. Sources providing coverage on activities. In criminal field Bonn reported location of 22 fugitives and/or Selective Service delinquents in last 12 months. Valuable information also developed in several car theft ring cases, major thefts in U. S. and activities in Black Panther movement in Algeria. While 7 HILEV items worthy of dissemination to the White House (3 in August) have been submitted, there is a definite need for expansion and intensification. Positive program for this purpose outlined. Legat of definite opinion great majority accomplishments in all areas achieved only because of presence our personnel and would not have been possible through normal diplomatic channels. No substantive errors detected.

Administrative Operations - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Office is capably administered. Chief Clerk's Office operating efficiently and work current. Stenographic production above average even though time spent on clerical duties is high. Continued close attention to all administrative functions stressed.

Personnel Matters - Very Good (Last Inspection - Very Good). Personnel complement 3 Agents and 4 clerk-stenographers (2 Agents and 3 clerk-stenographers last inspection). Thorough analysis by Inspector of work load, types of cases, and experience of personnel determined Agents required to spend too much time in office handling high volume of security matters (Communications Intercept Service). Overtime essential, productive and equitably shared. Time in office higher than should be due to above-mentioned processing of mail. Morale appears high. Language ability Agent personnel satisfactory.

Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Productive and cordial liaison maintained with diversified contacts, both American and foreign, throughout territory. Legat recognizes need for cultivating and expanding contacts, especially in HILEV field. Instructed to do so. All contacts expressed highest regard for and confidence in Director and our Bonn personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. George A. Van Noy, GS-16 at \$33,757, aged 57, nonveteran, not on probation. Legat since 9/19/55; fully available. Makes excellent personal appearance;

- 2 -

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache, Bonn

quiet, but engaging personality; effective Bureau representative; highly respected by associates and others with whom he has contact. Fully qualified to continue as Legat. If approved, attached letter to Van Noy will summarize inspection findings.

JWP

2. Floyd R. Peters, GS-15 at \$25,059, aged 54, veteran, not on probation; Assistant Legat since 6/28/70, Number One Man since 2/19/71. Peters is a dedicated, hard-working Agent who is capably discharging his responsibilities. Qualified to continue as Assistant Legat and for further administrative advancement commensurate with needs of Bureau; fully available.

JWP

3. The Bonn Office handles a high volume of cases in security, criminal, liaison, intelligence and related areas. Legat feels, and inspection confirms, that great majority of accomplishments achieved only because of presence of our personnel on the scene. It is recommended, therefore, that office of Legal Attache, Bonn, be continued.

C.K.
H

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PETER
7 JWP

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DATE: August 24, 1971

Tolson _____
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Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
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Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. K. PONDER

SUBJECT: INSPECTION - OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
TOKYO, JAPAN
INSPECTOR MASON G. WORKING
7/31 - 8/6/71

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 RLM/206
ON 10/26/00

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Officials: Harold L. Child, Jr., Legal Attache (Legat) 11/14/54 to 12/4/67 and since 6/26/69. Roderick V. Precht, Jr., Assistant Legat 6/12/66 to 11/7/67; Legat 11/7/67 to 5/28/69. Assistant Legat since 5/28/69. Last inspection: 11/14 - 22/70.

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Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan (Attention Mr. H. N. Bassett) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Mr. Brennan (Attention Foreign Liaison Desk) (Sent Separately)
- 1 - Personnel Files Harold L. Child, Jr. and Roderick V. Precht, Jr. (Sent Separately)

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Tokyo, Japan

~~SECRET~~

Service delinquents located in 9-month period since last inspection (comparable to 9 and 14 in one-year period, last inspection). No recoveries this inspection or last. Since inception High Level Intelligence (HILEV) Program in September, 1970, 43 HILEV items submitted; 20 disseminated to White House. Legat affording aggressive and imaginative attention to HILEV Program. High-level sources and contacts furnishing valuable intelligence data -- instructed to develop additional sources and contacts of this caliber. Legat extremely knowledgeable of political, social, economic, and intelligence situation in territory covered.

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Contacts - Excellent (Last Inspection - Excellent). Quality high-level contacts maintained in strategic branches of police and security agencies in all countries covered. Program very effective. 71 contacts developed since last inspection. 9 National Academy (NA) graduates occupy responsible positions; 3 additional candidates in current NA session. All persons contacted during inspection spoke highly of Director, FBI and Tokyo personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Harold L. Child, Jr., GS-17 at \$36,000, aged 51, nonveteran, not on probation. Legat Tokyo 11/14/54 to 12/4/67 and since 6/26/69. Makes excellent personal appearance and has excellent personality. Conscientious, aggressive, highly intelligent and capable administrator. Excellent command of Japanese language. Extremely well qualified to continue in present assignment or for further advancement. If approved, attached letter will advise him of inspection findings.

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Inspection - Office of Legal Attache
Tokyo, Japan

~~SECRET~~

2. Roderick V. Precht, Jr., GS-15 at \$26,675, aged 45, veteran, not on probation. Assistant Legat, Tokyo, 6/12/66 to 11/7/67; Legat 11/7/67 to 5/28/69; and Assistant Legat since 5/28/69. Makes excellent personal appearance. Has mature, intelligent, and businesslike approach to all assignments and responsibilities. He is most personable, very enthusiastic, and loyal. Has capably demonstrated ability to handle Legat position in past and well qualified for administrative advancement. Retention in present position justified.

Pm

3. During current inspection all pending investigative matters and overall operation of Legat, Tokyo, subjected to penetrative and in-depth analysis. All phases of Legat operation being afforded vigorous attention with particular emphasis on obtaining HILEV data. Presence of Legat has resulted in obtaining HILEV data disseminated to President and other Government agencies, which information would not be available without Bureau representative on scene. To fulfill our obligations concerning internal security of U. S. and particularly to the President, it is essential that Legat, Tokyo, be retained.

✓ 7 Pm

G.R.
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mock
19/26/00 SP-7 ALM/HG

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1 - Mr
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Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Brennan, C.D. _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

24 2
September 23, 1970

BY LIAISON

Foreign General

Honorable H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

at mork
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALM/ATC*
ON *10/26/00*

Dear Mr. Haldeman:

By letter dated September 21, 1970, addressed to the President, I outlined the manner in which this Bureau might expand its coverage abroad in an effort to produce intelligence information of a high quality.

After giving further consideration to this matter, I would like to advise you that it is my feeling that the opening of an FBI liaison office in Beirut, Lebanon, would place us in an area where we might be able to develop intelligence data relating particularly to the Middle East situation. Accordingly, with the President's approval, I will establish a liaison office in Beirut.

Sincerely yours,

Classified by *6283*
Exempt from GDS, Category *3*
Date of Declassification Indefinite

WRW:ams
(8)

REC-153

67-539244-297
Searched

LB NOTE: See cover memorandum Sullivan to Mr. Tolson 9/22/70, "Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection Efforts," WCS:csh. *46*

Classified "Secret" to protect sensitive Bureau operations abroad.

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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19 SEP 24 1970

ENCLOSURE

PERS REC UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: 9-22-70

FROM : C. D. Brennan

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORTS

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Based on my memorandum 9-21-70, the Director approved instructing all Legats to expand their current coverage and to advise of their plans and recommendations for accomplishing this. We have prepared a cablegram to all Legats, informing them of our proposal for expansion, advising them of the President's need for more intelligence information of a high quality and instructing them to increase their coverage in order to secure this. We ask for cable response within 24 hours with plans and recommendations for accomplishing our objectives.

ACTION:

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2ALM/26*
ON *10/26/00*

Attached for approval is the cablegram to all Legats discussed above.

Enclosure - Sent 9-23-70

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. G. A. Day
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Desk

GAD:plm
(11)

"O.K. Expedite in every way. Begin selection now for such assignments so Tolson may pass upon them. H"

Classified by *6283 WOCB*
Exempt from GDS, Category *B*
Date of Declassification Indefinite

COPY REMOVED BY SRD

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ENCLOSURE

1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. W. M. Felt

9-22-70

CODE

DECLASSIFIED BY *#m 0816*
ON *10/26/00* *SP-2 ALM/176*

CABLEGRAM

SECRET

URGENT

TO ALL LEGATS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. G. A. Day
1 - Foreign Liaison Desk

EXPANSION OF FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORTS.

AS, RESULT OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, I AM INSTRUCTING EACH LEGAT TO CONSIDER AND MAKE IMMEDIATE PLANS FOR THE COLLECTION OF POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ABROAD. IN AN EFFORT TO SATISFY THE PRESIDENT'S NEED FOR MORE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OF A HIGH QUALITY, I PROPOSE TO ADD ONE AGENT TO PARIS, BONN, AND ROME, AND TWO AGENTS TO BUENOS AIRES, AS WELL AS OPENING NEW OFFICES IN TEL AVIV, SAIGON, CARACAS, SAN JOSE, LA PAZ, AND HELSINKI. PARIS SHOULD STEP UP ITS COVERAGE IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE. BONN SHOULD TAKE OVER COVERAGE IN AUSTRIA AND CONTINUE HANDLING NETHERLANDS. ROME WILL RE-ESTABLISH MEDITERRANEAN ROAD TRIP COVERING TURKEY AND CYPRUS. BUENOS AIRES WILL ADD PARAGUAY TO ITS TERRITORY AND SHOULD MAKE PLANS FOR COVERAGE OF CHILE, POSSIBLY THROUGH ARGENTINIAN SOURCES. TEL AVIV WILL BE EXPECTED TO SERVE AS LISTENING POST FOR MIDDLE EAST EXCEPT TURKEY. SAIGON WILL HANDLE VIETNAM WHILE HONG KONG WILL CONTINUE SOUTHEAST ASIA ROAD TRIP. CARACAS WILL HANDLE ECUADOR,

GAD:plm
(12)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Classified by *6283*
Exempt from GDS, Category *1*
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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ENCLOSURE

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

CABLEGRAM TO ALL LEGATS
RE: EXPANSION OF FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION EFFORTS

COLOMBIA, GUYANA, SURINAM, FRENCH GUIANA, PANAMA, AND ISLANDS
ADJACENT TO VENEZUELA. SAN JOSE WILL COVER ALL CENTRAL AMERICA
EXCEPT PANAMA, LA PAZ WILL PLAN COVERAGE OF PERU, AND HELSINKI
WILL COVER ALL SCANDANAVIAN COUNTRIES.

EACH LEGAT SHOULD CONSIDER EFFECT OF ABOVE PROPOSALS ON
HIS OWN TERRITORY AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUCAB WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR
HOURS WITH COMMENTS AND PLANS FOR SECURING THE INFORMATION THE
PRESIDENT DESIRES. IT IS FULLY RECOGNIZED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION IS WITHIN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY JURISDICTION,
BUT THE CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAVE PROMPT, ACCURATE, AND INFORMATIVE INTELLIGENCE
UPON WHICH TO BASE DECISIONS AFFECTING SECURITY OF THIS COUNTRY.
SITUATION VARIES FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER, AND LEGAT IN
SWITZERLAND, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY NOT BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE
SAME DEPTH OF COVERAGE POSSIBLE IN MEXICO. NEVERTHELESS, EACH
LEGAT IS EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO OUR EFFORTS IN THIS NEW FIELD.
THERE IS TO BE NO DISCUSSION OF ABOVE MATTERS OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE
NOTE: UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL.

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan dated 9-22-70,
captioned as above, prepared by GAD:plm

- 2 -
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 KLM/715
OF 10/26/00

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TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 9/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

cc Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Brennan

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FBI FOREIGN COVERAGE

Late yesterday I received a call from Major General Alexander Haig, Advisor to the President on Foreign Affairs, in the office of Dr. Henry Kissinger. He said that he was with the President at the time the conversation took place with the Director, relative to opening some new FBI liaison offices and adding men to some of those already in existence. He said he thought it was an excellent idea and just wanted to pass on to the Bureau his own reaction. He said Dr. Kissinger certainly shares this same viewpoint.

General Haig went on to explain that this country needs more high-quality intelligence and a greater knowledge, in depth, of what is going on in the troubled areas of the world. He inquired where some of our new offices might be. I did not want to be definitive on the matter, but pointed out that the Director was giving consideration to opening some offices where, as he indicated, there was trouble, and where it was important for the United States to have high-quality information relative thereto. I said the Director was therefore considering countries like Israel, Venezuela, Lebanon, Finland, Bolivia, and the addition of some men in other offices, such as Buenos Aires.

General Haig said this is good, and he added that he thought it especially important for us to open offices in Israel, Lebanon and Finland. He said that he will be out of the country for awhile and I wished him a safe trip and this terminated the conversation.

ACTION -

For the information of the Director.

WCS:CSH (4)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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OCT 8 1970

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Classified by 6283 WOC/B
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

4:22 PM

October 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. MOHR
MR. C. D. BRENNAN
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. BISHOP

27
#mDE16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM 1/76
ON 10/26/00

While talking to Honorable H.R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, I mentioned that we have never heard anything from that expansion of our foreign service--the matter that had been turned over to him. Mr. Haldeman said he knew and that is one he is still working on and has to get nailed down.

I told him I would imagine he will have difficulty on that and Mr. Haldeman said he already has. I said knowing the State Department, they have always had a suspicion. Which is not true, that in these places where we have our men stationed that we are looking over their shoulder, which we do not do. I said I have instructed our people never to get involved in office politics and never to have too close contact socially with the Embassy personnel. I said I think they have some suspicion that we are kind of a watchdog on their carryings on in the Embassy, which is unfounded, and I think the expansion probably gives them a little more fear along that line. Mr. Haldeman said he will see what he can do, and I said that if I can be of any further help, to let me know.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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4:22 PM

October 15, 1970

Foreign General

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

MR. SULLIVAN

MR. MOHR

MR. C. D. BRENNAN

MR. CALLAHAN

MR. BISHOP

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DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALM/176*
ON *10/26/00*

While talking to Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, I mentioned that we have never heard anything from that expansion of our foreign service -- the matter that had been turned over to him. Mr. Haldeman said he knew and that is one he is still working on and has to get nailed down.

I told him I would imagine he will have difficulty on that and Mr. Haldeman said he already has. I said knowing the State Department, they have always had a suspicion, which is not true, that in these places where we have our men stationed that we are looking over their shoulder, which we do not do. I said I have instructed our people never to get involved in office politics and never to have too close contact socially with the Embassy personnel. I said I think they have some suspicion that we are kind of a watch dog on their carryings on in the Embassy, which is unfounded, and I think the expansion probably gives them a little more fear along that line. Mr. Haldeman said he will see what he can do, and I said that if I can be of any further help, to let me know.

Very truly yours,
J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

10 OCT 20 1970

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Unauthorized Disclosure

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Exempt from GDS, Category *3*
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Foreign General

29

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November 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

MR. SULLIVAN

MR. C. D. BRENNAN

Am 02/6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG
ON 10/26/00

On November 10, 1970, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, accompanied by General Haig, called at my office. Dr. Kissinger wanted to express his personal appreciation for the very valuable material which the Bureau had been supplying to him for the last two years. He stated that without it, it would have been very doubtful that he could have effectively performed his functions as he has been able to do.

Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had inquired of him as to what the status was as to the expansion of our foreign intelligence coverage.

I told Dr. Kissinger that in September the President had suggested to me that we should expand our foreign intelligence operations in order to obtain better quality of intelligence coverage in foreign areas and that I had in September, following the President's request, personally presented a letter to the President upon this proposed expansion and that, subsequently, on September 23, 1970, I had written a letter to Mr. Haldeman adding Beirut, Lebanon, as one of the new offices to be opened where a Legal Attache would be stationed.

I informed Dr. Kissinger that the President in my presence had handed to Mr. Haldeman my letter of September 21st and had instructed Mr. Haldeman to take it up direct with the Secretary of State and not down the line. The President was most insistent at that time that the expansion be effected promptly.

I told Dr. Kissinger that I had heard nothing further about this matter until three weeks ago when in conference with the Attorney General I mentioned to him the fact that so far as I knew, no action had been taken upon the President's instructions as to the expansion of our foreign intelligence. I advised Dr. Kissinger that the Attorney General indicated that there had been some complications and that he, the Attorney General, was going to confer with Mr. Haldeman shortly about this situation. I advised Dr. Kissinger

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Date of Declassification Indefinite
BY

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan, C. D. Brennan

November 16, 1970

that I had heard nothing further from the Attorney General nor Mr. Haldeman and that the situation is the same as it was on September 21st when I submitted my recommendations to the President.

I gave to Dr. Kissinger a copy of my letter which I personally presented to the President under date of September 21, 1970, together with a copy of my letter of September 23rd to Mr. Haldeman, in order to complete Dr. Kissinger's file.

Dr. Kissinger indicated that he would take this matter up very promptly with the President as it was the desire of the President that such implementation be promptly effected and that the delay since September should not have taken place.

Until I receive word from either Dr. Kissinger or Mr. Haldeman as to what the status is in this matter, we will take no action toward implementing our foreign intelligence coverage.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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~~SECRET~~ UNIT

Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

February 9, 1971

Director, FBI

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

LEGAL ATTACHES
EXPANSION OF FOREIGN COVERAGE
EMPLOYEES AND NEW OFFICES

Foreign General

At the specific request of the President and with the approval of the Department of State, this Bureau has increased the number of employees stationed abroad to a total of 88. There is attached a tabulation setting forth the revised number of employees by countries.

The Office of Management and Budget should be advised of these figures with the information that the expansion was made at the specific request of the President and with the verbal approval of the Secretary of State William P. Rogers. The requested expansion was confirmed by letter dated November 23, 1970, to Honorable William B. Macomber, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, Department of State, and a copy of this letter is attached in response to a verbal request from Mr. John J. Kaminski, Director, Office of Budget and Accounts, Department of Justice. However, subsequent to the transmission of this letter, it was decided not to open a Legal Attache office in Viet Nam, the proposed assignment for Costa Rica was changed to Nicaragua, and the staff at Mexico was reduced by one employee.

REC-135

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Enclosures (2)

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- Tolson
- Sullivan
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- Bishop
- Brennan, C.D.
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- Dalbey
- Felt
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- Rosen
- Tavel
- Walters
- Soyars
- Tele. Room
- Holmes

~~SECRET~~

FBI Personnel Stationed Abroad

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total Employees</u>
Argentina	6
Bolivia	2
Canada	5
Denmark	4
France	6
Germany	7
Hong Kong	4
Israel	4
Italy	4
Japan	4
Lebanon	2
Mexico	23
Nicaragua	4
Spain	2
Switzerland	2
United Kingdom	5
Venezuela	<u>4</u>
Total	88

~~SECRET~~

2/9/71

67-539244-359

ENCLOSURE

IV - A - 2

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan

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TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~ DATE: 12/11/70

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Foreign General

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, there is attached a letter to Dr. Kissinger informing him of developments in our expansion of our liaison abroad.

We point out that subsequent to his discussion with the Director on 11/10/70, Secretary of State Rogers telephoned the Director 11/20/70 and made arrangements for a meeting of Bureau representatives with Deputy Under Secretary of State William B. Macomber, Jr., on that date. At this meeting the details of the proposed expansion were discussed and confirmed by letter to Mr. Macomber dated 11/23/70. We note that on 12/1/70 State sent a cable to the proposed new posts which advised that our representatives would be maintaining a relationship with the policy (rather than police) agencies in the new countries and asking whether the new offices would present any difficulties. The letter points out that although the Director and Secretary Rogers agreed that no notification would be made to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), we were informed, 12/3/70, that Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II had, in fact, informed CIA.

The letter indicates that State's typographical error resulted in several unfavorable responses but these have been overcome with the exception of intolerable restrictions insisted upon by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Saigon, as result of which we have canceled our request to open there. We also inform Dr. Kissinger of the several instances (Helsinki and San Jose) in which we have agreed to changes in an effort to cooperate. We conclude by naming the new posts being opened and advising that our men will all be in place before Christmas.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ACTION:

Attached for approval is the letter discussed above.

Enclosure

GAD:bsf

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Classified by 10283 Woc/B
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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ENCLOSURE

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#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/7JG
ON 10/26/00

Foreign General 32

December 11, 1970

BY LIAISON

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

I feel that you should be informed of developments in our expansion of foreign liaison operations which have occurred since our discussion on November 10, 1970.

On November 20, 1970, Secretary of State William F. Rogers telephoned, stating he had discussed our expansion with the President and asking that I send a representative to work out the details with Deputy Under Secretary for Administration William B. Macomber, Jr. Mr. Rogers said he had some reservations concerning Helsinki, Finland, as an FBI liaison post there might be misinterpreted as being in connection with the SALT talks. Mr. Rogers also said he would do nothing about informing the Central Intelligence Agency as he felt that neither State nor FBI should do this in view of the President's participation in the matter, to which I agreed.

2 DEC 14 1970

FBI representatives discussed the details of our expansion with Mr. Macomber and his staff on the same date and were informed that clearance for my proposals was granted. I confirmed this by letter to Mr. Macomber on November 23, 1970. On December 1, 1970, a Department of State telegram was dispatched to the Ambassadors in the countries where new liaison posts were to be established. This telegram informed the Ambassadors of the approved expansion and asked whether it would present any difficulties.

In a statement of the purpose of the new posts, the telegram said that my representatives would develop and maintain a relationship with policy agencies of the various countries although the Department of State had been informed that this relationship would be with police agencies. Several of the

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SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
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Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassadors, no doubt concerned at this apparent intrusion into their responsibilities, raised questions; and it was necessary for special clarification to be furnished to our Ambassador in Bolivia. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Saigon, South Vietnam, attempted to impose intolerable restrictions with the result that I have canceled my request to open a liaison post there.

I have made every effort to be cooperative with the Department of State in this matter. When it appeared that the post in Helsinki, Finland, created a problem, I suggested Copenhagen, Denmark, as an alternative. Again, when the Ambassador in San Jose, Costa Rica, pointed out the "simply overwhelming" United States presence in that tiny country, I readily agreed to establish our Central American post in Managua, Nicaragua. On December 3, 1970, despite Secretary Rogers' statement concerning notification to the Central Intelligence Agency, I was informed that Under Secretary of State John M. Irvin II had, in fact, discussed our expansion with the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the absence of any additional problems being raised by the Department of State, new liaison posts are being opened in La Paz, Bolivia; Beirut, Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; Managua, Nicaragua; Tel Aviv, Israel; and Copenhagen, Denmark. The personnel for these posts have been selected, trained, and all will have arrived at their destinations by December 21, 1970. In addition to the new offices, I have further strengthened our operations by the addition of personnel to existing posts at Paris, France; Bonn, Germany; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and Rome, Italy. A reduction is being made in Mexico City, Mexico, in view of the transfer of the Central American territory, formerly handled from that office, to our post at Managua, Nicaragua.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated 12/11/70, captioned "Expansion of Foreign Liaison," prepared by GAD:bsf.

- 2 -

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IV - A - 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2ALM/746

C O P Y

10:54 AM

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November 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. SULLIVAN
MR. MOHR
MR. BISHOP
MR. C. D. BRENNAN
MR. CALLAHAN

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/716
10/26/00

Secretary of State William P. Rogers called. He stated he was calling, after a discussion with the President, about the Bureau's liaison offices abroad, and, of course, he thought it was a good idea and they (the State Department) are enthusiastic about it, but he had just one question which he thought could be handled on the phone due to his busy schedule. He said the only one he had any reservation about is Helsinki, Finland, the reason being, if word gets out, it could appear that it is in connection with the SALT talks or that we are trying to be provocative. He continued that if I thought it will be productive, he thought they were perfectly prepared to take the slight risk that is involved in open discussion about it, but if I thought it is not apt to be productive, he would prefer not to.

I told him I am perfectly willing to postpone it and not have it included in line with the recommendations we have made until after the SALT thing is over and if at that time it is felt desirable to have it there, it can be taken up again. Mr. Rogers suggested then why not go ahead on that basis as to the schedule I have proposed and not make a negative decision on Helsinki but hold it in abeyance as he thought if we could do this and it not get mixed up in SALT talks, it would be a good idea. I said it is a good listening post for information we might obtain, but on the other hand, if it would irritate the SALT talks, I am willing to postpone it.

Mr. Rogers said that was good and we would do that then; that he has spoken to Paul Macomber (William B. Macomber, Jr., Under Secretary for Administration), who is an old-timer and a Republican and sort of an Administrative Assistant, but he is the only one he has spoken to and the only one who knows about it, but he is willing to go ahead and put him in touch with anybody I would like. I told him I would arrange for an Assistant Director to get in touch with him and give the names of the people we want to put in these places so the Ambassadors in turn can be notified.

JEH:edm (10).

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

62-116395-547
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 6283 WOC/18
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

November 20, 1970

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan, Mohr, Bishop, C. C. Brennan, and Callahan

Mr. Rogers commented he thought this was a good development, and I said I thought it would help in getting additional information.

Mr. Rogers asked if Richard Helms, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), knew about it, and I told him he did not and I did not believe the President was desirous for him to know. I said that in September the President made the suggestion to me as he wanted better intelligence. Mr. Rogers said he, the President, mentioned it to him and it was his idea and nobody else's. I said when the President handed it to H. R. Haldeman he told him to take it up with him, Rogers, and only him, so I assume he did not notify the CIA and certainly we have not. Mr. Rogers said he would not do anything about it and will let the White House do it as he did not think State should or that we should. I said I thought it was up to the President.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10:54 AM

34
2 November 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

MR. SULLIVAN

MR. MOHR

MR. BISHOP

MR. C. D. BRENNAN

MR. CALLAHAN

S.I.S. ADMINISTRATIVE

Secretary of State William P. Rogers called. He stated he was calling, after a discussion with the President, about the Bureau's liaison offices abroad, and, of course, he thought it was a good idea and they (the State Department) are enthusiastic about it, but he had just one question which he thought could be handled on the phone due to his busy schedule. He said the only one he had any reservation about is Helsinki, Finland, the reason being, if word gets out, it could appear that it is in connection with the SALT talks or that we are trying to be provocative. He continued that if I thought it will be productive, he thought they were perfectly prepared to take the slight risk that is involved in open discussion about it, but if I thought it is not apt to be productive, he would prefer not to.

I told him I am perfectly willing to postpone it and not have it included in line with the recommendations we have made until after the SALT thing is over and if at that time it is felt desirable to have it there, it can be taken up again. Mr. Rogers suggested then why not go ahead on that basis as to the schedule I have proposed and not make a negative decision on Helsinki but hold it in abeyance as he thought if we could do this and it not get mixed up in SALT talks, it would be a good idea. I said it is a good listening post for information we might obtain, but on the other hand, if it would irritate the SALT talks, I am willing to postpone it.

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JEH:edm (10)

ENCLOSURE

XEROX

NOV 27 1970

SECRET

REC-5

Classified by 6283W
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

November 20, 1970

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan, Mohr, Bishop, C. D. Brennan,
and Callahan

Mr. Rogers commented he thought this was a good development,
and I said I thought it would help in getting additional information.

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Agency (CIA), knew about it, and I told him he did not and I did not believe
the President was desirous for him to know. I said that in September the
President made the suggestion to me as he wanted better intelligence.

Mr. Rogers said he; the President, mentioned it to him and it was his
idea and nobody else's. I said when the President handed it to H. R. ^{D.C.}

Waldeman he told him to take it up with him, Rogers, and only him, so
I assume he did not notify the CIA and certainly we have not. Mr. Rogers
said he would not do anything about it and will let the White House do it as
he did not think state should or that we should. I said I thought it was up to
the President.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- 2 -
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

MENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. C. A. Tolson

DATE: 11/20/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

As instructed, I met this afternoon with Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration William B. Macomber, Jr. Also present were Deputy Assistant Secretary for Organization and Management, Thomas Stern, Special Assistant J. Stewart Cottman, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, G. Marvin Gentile, and SA Graham Day, who accompanied me. Mr. Macomber and his aides stated that they had been instructed by Secretary Rogers to cooperate with us to the fullest and they indicated they would do everything in their power to assist us. I summarized for them our proposal to add five Agents to presently existing offices and to open six new offices (Beirut, Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; Saigon, Vietnam; San Jose, Costa Rica; and Tel Aviv, Israel) with a complement of nine Agents. They were aware that we will not assign men to Helsinki, Finland, at this time. Mr. Stern said that he would take care of the necessary establishment of additional positions abroad and Mr. Cottman said that he would immediately inform the interested embassies of the fact that clearance has been granted for the assignment of additional FBI personnel abroad as requested.

It was obvious that if it were not for the approval of the President and Secretary Rogers, clearance would have been extremely difficult, and I detected a slight lack of enthusiasm on the part of Stern and Cottman. Macomber, their superior, was, however, most cordial and cooperative and Gentile has been a strong Bureau supporter for a number of years.

The problem is now definitely in the lap of the Department of State and we will follow this aggressively to be sure no time is lost in opening the new offices.

ACTION:

For information.

WCS:bsf
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Tolson
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

PERS. REC. UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT : EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

SECRET

DATE: 11/23/70

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/715
ON 10/26/00 FOR 16

Tolson ✓
Sullivan ✓
Mohr ✓
Bishop ✓
Brannan ✓
Callahan ✓
Casper ✓
Conrad ✓
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
Rosen ✓
Tavel ✓
Walters ✓
Soyars ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holmes ✓
Gandy ✓

As indicated in his memorandum to Mr. Tolson 11-20-70, Mr. Sullivan furnished State the details of our proposal for additional personnel abroad on that date. Mr. Sullivan was informed that the additional overseas positions would be cleared immediately, and State was told that we would proceed to order the transfers.

The Director had approved the opening of an office in Helsinki, Finland, but this is not being done because of the current U. S. - Soviet negotiations. The Helsinki office was recommended as a point from which to handle the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway). This coverage could also be handled from Copenhagen, Denmark, which is on the continent, and would therefore cause no special concern to the Soviets. In fact, Copenhagen would be an ideal site for an office as we already have excellent contacts there and the populace is basically friendly. We believe State would have no objection to this and if we are going to establish a foothold in Scandinavia, now is the time while we have top-level backing.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a letter to Deputy Under Secretary of State Macomber formally confirming the request made by Mr. Sullivan and adding a request for a new office in Copenhagen, Denmark.

GAD:hc
(7)

Enclosure

- 1-Mr. Sullivan
- 1-Mr. Mohr
- 1-Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1-Mr. Callahan
- 1-Mr. Wannall
- 1-Mr. Day

Classified by 1683
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

25 DEC 3 1970

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

JAN 18 PERS. REC. UNIT
COPY MADE FOR MR. TOLSON

SECRET

November 23, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM 1/16

ON 10/26/00

Honorable William B. Macomber, Jr.
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. C. D. Brennan
1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Day

Dear Mr. Macomber:

Confirming discussion between you and your representatives and Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan of this Bureau on November 20, 1970, the following is an outline of the proposed increase in FBI personnel overseas:

There are now 28 Agents and 32 clerical personnel assigned to our 11 liaison posts abroad. No change is presently proposed in 7 of these posts. In the 4 remaining we propose change as follows:

Office	Present Complement		Additions		Total
	Agents	Clerks	Agents	Clerks	
Paris	2	2	1	1	6
Bonn	2	3	1	1	7
Rome	1	2	1	0	4
Buenos Aires	1	1	2	2	6

We propose to establish 6 new offices with personnel complements as follows:

Office	Complement		Total
	Agents	Clerks	
Beirut	1	1	2
Caracas, Venezuela	2	2	4
La Paz, Bolivia	1	1	2
Saigon, Vietnam	1	1	2
San Jose, Costa Rica	2	2	4
Tel Aviv, Israel	2	2	4

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars

GAD:hc
(8)

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

Honorable William B. Macomber, Jr. ~~SECRET~~

There are presently 60 FBI personnel assigned abroad. The above proposal contemplates assignment of 27 additional personnel for a total of 87.

In addition to the offices and personnel outlined above, I propose to open a new office at Copenhagen, Denmark, to be manned by two Special Agents and two clerks. This would be in lieu of the office at Helsinki, Finland, and it would cover the Scandinavian countries as is presently done by personnel stationed in London, England.

Personnel selected for all of the above assignments, with the exception of Copenhagen, are being ordered to report to their new stations promptly. It would be appreciated if you would advise me whether we may proceed to establish a new office at Copenhagen, Denmark.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE:

See memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. C. D. Brennan 11/23/70 captioned "Expansion of Foreign Liaison," GAD:hc.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: November 27, 1970

To: Presidential Appointments Staff
Department of State

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. DeBuck

Attention: Miss Betty L. Groves
Chief, Title and Rank

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: FBI PERSONNEL IN SAIGON, VIETNAM

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/796
10/26/00

Mr. Robert B. Hawley, who is currently assigned in the United States, is being designated Legal Attache at the United States Embassy in Saigon, Vietnam.

Mr. Hawley, who was born September 25, 1912, in Japan, has been employed by this Bureau since March 3, 1941. He attended the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree. He also attended Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, and received a Master of Arts degree. Mr. Hawley will be accompanied by his wife, Bonnie.

The foregoing is furnished for your official use and you may wish to advise the Embassy of the United States in Saigon of the above. It will not be necessary to have anyone meet Mr. Hawley and his wife upon arrival in Saigon.

1 - Foreign Liaison Desk (Detached)

HLD:bsf
(7)

NOTE:

Mr. Hawley is under transfer to Saigon, Vietnam.

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
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Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 12/8/70

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Foreign General

39
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/STG
ON 10/26/00

This summarizes the current status of our expansion of our foreign liaison. Following Mr. Sullivan's meeting with Deputy Under Secretary of State Macomber on 11/20/70, State, who had informed us that they would tell the interested embassies that clearance had been granted for assignment of additional FBI personnel abroad, forwarded cablegrams to the affected embassies. One cable went to the four embassies where we are adding to an existing office and another to the embassies where we propose to open new offices, with the exception of Copenhagen, Denmark, which had been the subject of our separate request 11/23/70. Both cables asked the Ambassadors to advise immediately of any difficulties foreseen. Responses from the countries where we now operate were prompt and favorable. Unfortunately, State, in its cable to the new countries referred to our intention to develop and maintain a cooperative relationship with the police and other investigative agencies of the countries covered and made a typographical error. The cable as forwarded indicated that we would be dealing with policy rather than police agencies. Nevertheless, favorable responses were received from most of the addressees. Exceptions were La Paz, Bolivia, and San Jose, Costa Rica.

La Paz expressed concern over the number of U. S. people there engaged in clandestine operations requiring cover and questioning what Bolivian policy agencies the FBI Agent would or could work with. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, has advised that State has cabled the Ambassador explaining the typographical error and pointing out that our Legat will not be operating in a clandestine fashion, that he will not be operational, and that his assignment there has been approved at the top level. Gentile says we should proceed to open our office in La Paz without regard to the Ambassador's comments.

GAD:bsf
(7)

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Day

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthenticated Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

With respect to Copenhagen, action has been delayed within State, according to Gentile, because of the recent incident involving the attempted defection of a Lithuanian from a Soviet fishing vessel. The cable informing the Embassy in Copenhagen laid for three days on the desk of Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, who has been testifying before a Congressional committee concerning State's part in that matter. Gentile advised 12/8/70 that Macomber had just approved and signed the cable and that he anticipates no difficulty or delay in the opening of our office in Denmark.

If approved, we will inform State that we will open our office in Managua, Nicaragua, instead of San Jose, Costa Rica, utilizing the same personnel already approved.

If approved, we will inform State that we will open our office in ~~Managua~~, Nicaragua, instead of San Jose, Costa Rica, utilizing the same personnel already approved.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 12/9/70

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
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Tele. Room _____
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Gandy _____

The attached cable from the U. S. Ambassador at San Jose refers to the establishment of a "four-man FBI office in San Jose." The Director inquired "Why did we ask for four persons to be in San Jose."

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/7TG
ON 10/26/00 #mde/6

The office which we proposed in San Jose would actually be a regional office responsible for all of Central America. We have heretofore covered five countries on a road trip basis from Mexico, but the new office would have included Panama and British Honduras, areas not previously covered but where a number of leads have arisen recently. There is a crying need for quality intelligence relating to this area resulting from the situation in Panama and acts of terrorism and violence in Guatemala. Honduras and El Salvador have recently been at war. Bureau criminal work in Central America has consistently increased in recent years. The full time of one man has been occupied in handling leads in five countries. Addition of a second agent and location of the office within the territory should permit more prompt and thorough handling of our leads as well as the development of the high-level intelligence being sought. To handle the clerical and stenographic work for these two agents, we recommended two clerical employees or a total of four persons for the new office. By separate memorandum, 12/8/70, we recommended that the Central American office be established in Managua, Nicaragua, instead of San Jose because of the "overwhelming" U. S. delegation presently in Costa Rica.

With respect to the comments of U. S. Ambassador Bunker, Saigon, South Vietnam, the Director stated that the Ambassador's requirement is unsatisfactory but typical and instructed that the office be canceled. In this regard the Director is, of course, absolutely right in his comment concerning the high-handed remarks of Bunker. We are aware, however, that part of the difficulty here lies with the State Department cable which notified the embassies where we proposed to open new offices.

Enclosures 12-11-70

GAD:bsf

(10)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Conrad

1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day

Classified by 539 244-576
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan
RE: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

~~SECRET~~

As discussed in my memorandum 12/8/70, a typographical error in this cable resulted in the Ambassadors' being informed that our liaison representatives would develop and maintain a close cooperative relationship with the policy agencies of the countries which they would cover whereas State had been told that we would be developing this relationship with police agencies. It is surprising that more Ambassadors did not protest this apparent intrusion into their personal responsibilities. We have already pointed out this error to State, who acknowledged it and, in fact, State corrected this in a separate cable to La Paz because the Ambassador there had made specific reference to our contact with policy agencies. We feel we should go on written record as well regarding this error.

ACTION:

If approved:

(1) The Administrative Division will promptly cancel the transfers which have been issued to personnel destined for Saigon, South Vietnam (one agent, one clerk).

*Cancl. letters on Robert B. Hawley & Sandra D. Jackson
prepared 12/15/70 jae*

*G.R.
H*

(2) The attached letter will inform the Department of State that we are canceling our proposal to open an office in Saigon and will protest the misstatement of our function in the State cable which was sent to six Ambassadors.

*OSW
B*

*WES
JPM*

*G.R. ✓
H*

A

*sent
WBS
R/S*

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

BY COURIER SVC.
9 9 DEC 1 1
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
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Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
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Conrad _____
Felt _____
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Tavel _____
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Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

GAD:bsf
(11)

NOTE:

See memorandum W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan,
dated 12/9/70, captioned "Expansion of Foreign Liaison,"
prepared by GAD:bsf.

21-62-116395-547
ENCLOSURE
SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

December 10, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Felt
- 1 - Mr. Tavel
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Day

Honorable William B. Macomber, Jr.
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Macomber:

I have reviewed the various responses forwarded
by the United States Ambassadors in the embassies where
the FBI proposed to establish new liaison posts and I am
disturbed by the apparent misconception regarding the
purpose of these posts. It would appear that this
misconception arises directly from a typographical error
appearing in the Department of State cable number 68641
informing those embassies that FBI liaison representatives
are stationed abroad to develop and maintain a close
cooperative relationship with the police and other
investigative agencies of the countries which they visit.
You were informed that such a relationship would be
developed with the police and other investigative
agencies, which is a quite different function.

In view of the comments of the United States
Ambassador in Saigon, I am herewith canceling my request
to establish a liaison post there.

I request that you take the necessary action to
insure that the Ambassadors who were misinformed concerning
the function of my liaison representatives are properly
advised of the true nature of our activities abroad.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 14, 1970

To: Presidential Appointments Staff
Department of State

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day

Attention: Miss Betty L. Groves
Chief, Title and Rank

#mDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/116
10/26/00

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Foreign General

Subject: FBI PERSONNEL IN SAIGON, VIETNAM

Reference is made to my letter dated November 27, 1970, and captioned as above which concerned the assignment of Mr. Robert B. Hawley to the United States Embassy at Saigon, Vietnam, as Legal Attache.

Plans to establish a Legal Attache Office in Saigon and to assign Mr. Hawley as Legal Attache have been canceled.

The foregoing is furnished for your official use and you may wish to advise the Embassy of the United States in Saigon of the above.

1 - Foreign Liaison Desk (Detached)

RAB:wmc Wmc
(6)

10 DEC 15 1970

NOTE:

See memorandum Wannall to C.D. Brennan, dated 12/8/70, captioned "Expansion of Foreign Liaison," which concerns cancellation of plans to open an office in Saigon.

539244-332

Tolson _____
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Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
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Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

*Cannot be located. Apparently referenced in error. Memorandum referenced is most likely Wannall to Brennan memorandum, 12/9/70, which is furnished.

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

Classified by 6/28/83 WOC
Exempt from GDS Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

BY COURIER SVC.

04 DEC 15

COMM-FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 12/17/70

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

We have now received State Department clearance for the last of the new liaison posts and are proceeding to establish communications channels so that operations may commence promptly.

State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Marvin Gentile advised, 12/17/70, that the U. S. Ambassador at Managua, Nicaragua, who had said he would clear the office with Nicaraguan President Somoza, had responded indicating our office had been fully accredited. He asked for details regarding space and services needed and State is informing him that these details will be discussed with him by the Legal Attache. As indicated in cable from Mexico, 12/16/70, new Legal Attache Miller is now in bed under doctor's orders suffering from red measles. He is expected to be released 12/23/70 and will drive to Managua in his personally owned automobile carrying necessary supplies to sustain operations pending receipt of additional supplies from the Bureau.

Prior clearance had already been granted for the other five new offices. The new Legal Attaches will all be in place on or before 12/21/70, except for Legat Miller.

ACTION:

For information. An SAC Letter is being prepared to notify the field of our new foreign liaison coverage.

GAD:bsf
(9)

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Tavel
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Day

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

SENT 12-18-70

JAN 14 1971

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
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Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: December 17, 1970

FROM : J. B. Adams

SUBJECT: FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS
TOURS OF DUTY

With respect to the establishment of the new Legat post at Managua, Nicaragua, inquiry was made of State Department to determine if this post was considered to be a hardship post. State Department advised that the average State Department officer is assigned there for only two years because of the extreme heat, humidity, and other environmental conditions. The State Department does not request employees to serve more than one tour of duty in Nicaragua. There is also a pay differential of ten percent.

The Director previously approved shortening the tours of duty of other Legat posts which were considered to be hardship assignments (La Paz, Bolivia, and Caracas, Venezuela).

RECOMMENDATION:

That the tour of duty for those employees to be assigned to Managua, Nicaragua, be established at two years.

- 1 - Mr. Clark
- 1 - Mr. Row
- 1 - Movement
- 1 - Special Coordination Unit

TJF:nn
(6)

67-53925

REC-131

6 JAN 20 1971

11 DEC 31 1970

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

XEROX

JAN 29 1971

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

62-116375-547

PERM. REC. UN